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Abstract
We investigate the options for enhancing the welfare of small farmers in Thailand through
subsidies of irrigation infrastructure. Enhanced water storage and irrigation can significantly
improve yield and the welfare of the farm community by providing a more reliable water sup-
ply during growing periods. Generally speaking, such enhancements require subsidies from the
government or other organizations since farmers are not able or willing to finance infrastructure
development themselves. In order to maximize the eﬀectiveness of such subsidies it is important
to understand how farmers will react to alternative policies. We develop a two-tier approach
to this problem. First, we use a government-level optimization model to identify the set of
subsidies and water pricing policies that maximizes a stated measure of aggregate social welfare.
This government-level model relies on a farm-level model that determines how individual small
farmers will react to the policy alternatives. The farm-level model combines hydrologic, eco-
nomic, and agronomic features since it considers how hydrologic variability aﬀects crop yield,
which in turn aﬀects the farmer’s utility.
Policy decision variables considered in the government subsidy/pricing model include 1)
water price and the number of farms served by public storage facilities (i. e. a water supply
reservoir and enhanced in-stream storage), 2) maximum sizes of on-farm ponds paid for by the
government, and 3) amounts of direct cash subsidies paid to the farmer. The objective is to
maximize the aggregate welfare of all farmers served subject to a limit on the total subsidy
as well as constraints designed to limit inequities and urban migration. The problem is solved
with a deterministic nonlinear programming algorithm.
Decision variables considered in the farm-level model include 1) whether or not to accept a
government-subsidized on-farm pond (which reduces land available for cultivation), 2) how much
to consume in each year, 3) whether to devote time to agriculture or oﬀ-farm employment, 4)
type of crop and irrigation technique, and 5) amount of water purchased from communal storage
facilities. The problem is solved using a finite-horizon discrete-time stochastic programming
algorithm.
Our modeling approach is tested on a study site in Saraburi Province, Thailand. This site
serves as a suitable prototype because of its existing irrigation infrastructure, relatively well-
developed market institutions, secure land-use rights, and weak endowment of water resources.
To achieve an economic optimum in which the farmers’ aggregate utility of consumption is
maximized, the government must provide some farmers with free reservoir water. The remaining
2
farmers, however, help pay for the subsidy at a relatively high price. Consequently, the latter
seek urban employment during the dry seasons. This cross-subsidy solution resulting from the
social optimum criteria is economically eﬃcient yet markedly inequitable.
In order to assure equity, the government should construct the reservoir and sell the storage
water at the same price to all farms. However, this solution cannot prevent urban migration.
In order to prevent oﬀ-farm employment, the government may provide a large pond for some
farmers and provide cheap reservoir water for the others. The equity problem remains. Despite
the social gains, these two solutions yield lower aggregate farmers’ utility.
The results indicate that an economically optimal solution brings about the aforementioned
adverse outcomes. In practice, the government faces a tradeoﬀ between economic eﬃciency
and the political objectives.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The eﬀects of local hydrology on the availability of water are critical to successful agriculture.
Significant variations in water supply can adversely aﬀect crop yields. Strong monsoon rains
and low permeability soils combine to cause damaging floods. Flooding can damage crops
through submergence or uprooting. On the other hand, sporadic dry periods within the
wet season and uncertainty in the time of onset of the wet season create drought hazards for
agriculture in monsoonal Asia. Drought can cause desiccation or poor plant development.
Despite a weak endowment of water resources, Thailand has a relatively favorable land/person
ratio, well-developed marketing network, secure land-use rights in much of the country, and an
extensive agricultural credit system compared to its main regional competitors of China, In-
donesia, and Vietnam. Consequently, improving agricultural productivity and competitiveness
continues to be a priority, particularly for addressing the food and income requirements of poor
households. Irrigation is one obvious way to increase productivity in the absence of stable
water resources. The country serves as a good example for testing water resource management
models due to its relatively well-developed market institutions.
Early investments in irrigation schemes in Thailand were large projects and concentrated
on major water distribution systems in the Central Plain. These investments were largely to
increase the yield of the wet-season rice crop in the central region by improving the reliability
of the water supply. Large-scale irrigation facilities, however, are not likely to be developed for
the vast majority of cultivated areas due to the scarcity of suitable sites and increasing political
pressure for environmental protection and against relocation.
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The emphasis has therefore shifted to smaller projects which oﬀer a promising way to al-
leviate droughts. Proposals for the development of irrigation in this region include not only
conventional storage facilities which encompass community-level reservoirs and water distrib-
ution networks, but also the construction of numerous small farm ponds, which collect local
runoﬀ and may be supplemented by larger storage reservoirs. This research seeks to determine
the viability of such a policy.
An analysis of the viability of such a plan calls for a well-integrated model in order to
predict the hydrology and economic response of the region. This research aims to bridge the
knowledge gap between hydrology, agronomy, and economics by developing a hybrid model that
considers hydrologic variability, crop yield, farmer’s utility, and government policy constraints.
The results of such a model enable the government to design the optimal agricultural policy for
a given budget constraint. The resulting optimal agricultural policy hinges on the eﬃciency of
private versus public actions.
This Chapter summarizes the objectives of the research and reviews previous work used
as a foundation for developing our methodology. Chapter 2 addresses problems surrounding
small-scale irrigated agriculture. The overall methodology is explained in Chapter 3. This
methodology relies on two models: one which takes the farmer’s perspective by maximizing the
individual farmer’s utility of consumption and one which takes the government’s perspective
by maximizing aggregate community utility subject to specified political constraints. The two
models interact such that the government’s policy decision uses the information from the farm-
level model to determine the optimal allocation of the limited subsidy. Chapter 4 formulates
the farm-level hydrologic-economic model and Chapter 5 discusses results obtained from this
model. Chapter 6 formulates the government-level model and Chapter 7 discusses policy
analyses carried out with this model. Finally, Chapter 8 provides a summary of contributions
of this research and areas for future work.
1.1 Objectives
• To accurately model farmer’s management decisions under hydrological uncertainty in
response to exogenous policy variables.
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We construct a hydrologic-economic model of small-scale irrigated farming household which
is dynamic and stochastic. The model can be used to investigate an individual farmer’s man-
agement decisions in response to hydrologic uncertainty. The farmer’s decisions include pond
construction, consumption behavior, time spent on agricultural activities, crop and irrigation
pattern, and amount of water purchased from public storage facilities. Exogenous variables of
interest are the price of water from government-funded storage facilities, the number of farms
sharing the storage facilities, the farmer’s attitude towards risk, and the oﬀ-farm wage rate.
It can serve as a module to investigate the small-scale farmer’s response to diﬀerent scenar-
ios in a way that respects individual preference and the experience of local farmers and their
community.
• To assess irrigation policy from the government’s perspective.
We develop a model that identifies a comprehensive government policy for subsidizing ir-
rigated agriculture while accounting for the preferences of individual farmers. The chosen
policy not only maximizes the aggregate farmers’ utility but also satisfies political objectives
regarding social optimum, equitable distribution, preservation of an agrarian society, and en-
vironmental quality. We apply this government-level model to evaluate policy options for
managing irrigation system to a case study of Saraburi Province, Thailand.
1.2 Previous Work
There is an extensive literature that considers how investment in water resources facilities may
alleviate drought and increase agricultural productivity. Understanding economic dynamics
such as precautionary savings, consumption smoothing and resource allocation are also essential
to correctly assess the farmer’s behavioral response to policy. However, only a few of the studies
reviewed below established a link between the technical viability and welfare implications of
each associated policy. In addition to carrying out a hydrologic-economic feasibility analysis of
irrigation investment, this thesis considers how to optimally manage agricultural policies from
a social planner’s perspective.
Our overall approach combines the concepts of water harvesting, crop simulation, economic
decision-making and agricultural investment in the presence of risk. The research considers
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how hydrologic variability aﬀects crop yield, which in turn aﬀects the farmer’s utility. Water
harvesting provides means for eﬃcient use of the water resources within a farm’s boundary
and consequently reduces the risk of adverse weather condition. The research assumes the
adoption of this technique such that the available water resources are used to best advantage.
Crop simulation models allow predictions of crop growth and yield under specified conditions.
As a result, the predicted crop yield suggests agricultural income.
Ultimately the farmer decides on his economic behaviors based on his knowledge of water
variability and of future agricultural income, as well as his attitude towards risk. Uncertainty
concerning future income lowers consumption. This is often called the precautionary demand
for savings. The concept of consumption smoothing and precautionary savings dictates how
the farmer’s utility responds to various irrigation policies. Many of these background studies
overlap with the literature review in Amornvivat (2002).
1.2.1 Water Harvesting
Water harvesting, defined in its broadest sense as the collection of runoﬀ for productive use
[86], is an ancient art practiced in the past in many parts of North America, the Middle East,
North Africa, and Asia. More precisely, water harvesting can be defined as the process of
concentrating rainfall as runoﬀ from a larger catchment area to be used in a smaller target
area. This process may occur naturally or artificially [64].
Water harvesting supports a flourishing agriculture in many dry areas, where rainfall is low
and erratic in distribution. Examples are given, among others, by Oweis and Taimeh (1996),
Suleman et al. (1995), Krisna et al. (1987) and Oswal (1994). However, for any agricultural
water development to be successful, it must be economically sustainable. The sustainability of
various water harvesting techniques is found to depend largely upon the timing and the amount
of rainfall ([18],[77], and [11]). A good historical review of rainwater harvesting for agriculture
is given in UNEP (1983).
Although the revival of water harvesting techniques began in the early 1930s, little construc-
tion and research activity began before the late 1950s, as pointed out by Frasier and Myers
(1983). In the 1960s, various governmental, private, and university research organizations,
particularly in arid and semiarid areas, initiated studies to develop and evaluate new methods
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and materials for designing, constructing, and managing water harvesting with lower instal-
lation costs and improved system reliability. As a result, new terms and names related to
water harvesting techniques have appeared in the literature during the last two decades [19].
Recently, there has been renewed interest in water harvesting in South and Southeast Asia,
probably as a result of lack of water in times of need. Water scarcity is the dominant obstacle
to increasing productivity of most rainfed ricelands [10].
1.2.2 Crop Simulation
Crop modeling enables researchers to integrate knowledge from diﬀerent disciplines in a quanti-
tative way. That, in turn, helps researchers understand the underlying processes that determine
the behavior of complex agricultural systems. Mathematical models are caricatures of real-
world systems. Solving the equations enables a numerical description of the system to be
produced. Ultimately, ‘what if’ questions can be asked about the functioning of a system, and
numerical answers are provided [67]. Hansen and Jones (2000) surveyed issues and approaches
related to applying crop models at scales larger than the plot.
Crop models are particularly useful in analyzing tropical ecosystems, which are characterized
by high temporal variability and spatial heterogeneity of the environment. A limited number
of field experiments cannot provide a reliable basis for management strategies under the myriad
possible conditions that exist. Simulation models can replace expensive and time-consuming
experiments due to their ability to generalize experimental findings and help interpret the results
of a few selected experiments (see [95], [83], [105], and [12], for examples).
Modeling is especially useful in yield gap analysis, a method for identifying constraints to
agricultural production in diﬀerent agroclimatic zones. From yield gap analysis, constraints on
yield can be identified. Pinnschmidt et al. (1996) concentrated on ameliorating those factors
that contribute to the gap between farm yield, potential farm yield, and potential experiment
station yield.
1.2.3 Consumption Smoothing and Precautionary Saving
The literature has attempted to provide empirical evidence of individual’s risk attitudes and
the eﬀect of precautionary saving on consumption. These attempts may be classified into
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two main approaches: experimental and econometric. A critical diﬀerence between them is
that the former is based on simulations in which individuals are presented with hypothetical
questionnaires regarding risk alternatives, with and without real payments, while the latter has
the advantage of being based on individuals’ actual decisions [6].
The experimental approach, for example, has been used by MacAulay and Hertzler (2000),
Pender (1998), Pender and Kerr (1998), and Timmins (1996). The econometric approach has
been used in variety of circumstances. Fafchamps (1993), Hazell and Norton(1986), Paris and
Easter (1995), Saha (1994), and Saha and Stroud (1994) used econometric approaches to study
risk attitudes of decision-makers assuming expected utility maximization.
The theory of precautionary saving is shown to be equivalent to the Arrow-Pratt theory of
risk aversion, making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to
precautionary saving and consumption smoothing—and more generally, to the theory of optimal
choice under risk [47]. A wide range of both theoretical and empirical studies includes [6], [7],
[55], [56], [78], [96], and [97].
1.2.4 Agricultural Investment Under Risk
Previous studies have addressed the economic feasibility of on-farm impoundments. Burt and
Stauber (1971) study such investments. However, they focused on irrigation scheduling with-
out addressing water availability, water supply reliability, impoundment size and crop choice.
Krishna et al. (1987) studied the economic feasibility of on-farm ponds in east Texas, but
assumed deterministic water supply and irrigation demand along with fixed impoundment size
and irrigated land area. Dudley et al. (1971a, b, 1972) developed short, intermediate, and
long-run optimizing models using stochastic water supply and demand to determine the combi-
nation of reservoir size and irrigated acreage for a single crop. Their approach did not allow for
irrigated/dryland crop substitution or multiple crop substitution. Other studies have assumed
availability of suﬃcient water ([3] and [65]).
Nevertheless, the eﬀect of risk attributes has not been comprehensively examined in the
irrigation system investment context. The reduction in income variability can be an impor-
tant impetus for irrigation adoption [3], [103]. Pender (1992) proposes welfare analysis for
investment in shallow wells; whereas Featherstone and Goodwin (1993) discuss the eﬀect of
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risk aversion on farmer’s choice in soil conservation. Ziari et al. (1995) uses a risk-sensitive
model which simultaneously considers water supply, irrigation system investment, irrigation
scheduling, and crop mix selection to evaluate the economic feasibility of small impoundments.
At the basin level, Evers et. al. (1998) developed an integrated approach to reservoir, irriga-
tion, and cropping management, consisting of (1) hydrologic, (2) crop simulation, (3) economic,
and (4) dynamic programming models. Evers’s model however does not account for farmers’
risk-mitigating behavior.
This study considers a number of the factors omitted in the aforementioned studies. Our
holistic approach allows a detailed analysis within one consistent framework. A single social
planner responsible on agricultural irrigation can analyze a variety of management options. Our
proposed methodology serves as an important tool which provides guidance for infrastructure
investment and policy management of water resources for small-scale agriculture.
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Chapter 2
Problems of Small-scale Irrigated
Agriculture
This Chapter reviews the diﬃculties facing small-scale farmers and the obstacles to sustainable
and equitable rural development. A number of analytical studies on these issues have been
conducted over the past decades. The focus of this chapter is on synthesizing the disparate
findings of these existing works into an integrated approach appropriate for small-scale irrigated
agricultural communities.
The problems described here are taken from examples in rural and semi-rural Thailand
because we use the semi-rural area in Saraburi Province in the central region of Thailand as
our study site. This Chapter lays out a list of problems which also are commonly experienced
by small-scale irrigated agriculture in other areas and are addressed in our study.
2.1 Water-limited Agricultural Productivity
Water in Thailand is mainly used for agricultural production and is increasingly scarce in
the dry season due to increased competition from industrial and urban water users, as well
as demands for in-stream uses such as inland navigation and deterring saline intrusion from
salt water along the coast. In a good year, only 35 percent of irrigable area in the lower
Chao Praya, the country’s main agricultural area, receives suﬃcient water in the dry season.
Moreover, agricultural deliveries are cut first in exceptionally dry years, such as 1993-1994 and
22
1998-1999. The worsening trend in water availability has become particularly apparent in
the non-irrigated arable land. Unseasonably sporadic precipitation has caused crop failure in
vast sections of non-irrigated area. There is an urgent need for more supplemental irrigation
projects.
Overuse of surface and groundwater sources has been identified as the major obstacle to sus-
tainable agricultural productivity in Thailand. Thailand’s past three decades of rapid economic
development stimulated an explosive expansion of demand for water services—for hydropower,
irrigation and domestic and industrial water supply. During the 1980’s alone, water demand
more than doubled, from 20,530 million cu.m. per year in 1980 to 43,000 million cu.m. in 1990
[93]. In response, the government adopted an approach that focused almost exclusively on de-
velopment of new supplies and distribution systems, with little attention given to management
aspects.
An integrated framework is essential to justify investment in supplemental irrigation in-
frastructure. Equally important is more eﬀective management of scarce water resources through
a more participatory and transparent allocation system. Possibilities include introducing trad-
able water rights, establishing new mechanisms for stakeholder management of water resources
at the basin, sub-basin and water user levels, and streamlining and clarifying the institutional
arrangements for operation of water-related infrastructure. A reduced role for government, a
larger role for water users and other stakeholders, and the phased introduction of cost recovery
and water pricing policies are important parts of overall agricultural reform.
2.2 Indivisible Investment
Some irrigation projects are too large and indivisible for poor farmers to finance. Although
irrigation projects are urgently needed to provide more secure water supply to arable areas,
poor households do not have the means to invest in such projects. Rural poverty remains the
chief obstacle to agricultural investment, despite the fact that Thailand’s impressive pre-crisis
growth has raised incomes for many rural households. While the national poverty rate declined
to 11 percent in 1996, there are several problems: the incidence of poverty is greatest in rural
areas, with 15 percent of people living in villages below the poverty line; and there are extreme
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regional disparities, with the Northeast and North accounting for about three-quarters of all
poor. After the economic crisis of 1997, the proportion of the poor has increased to 13.0 percent
in 1998, approximately 7.9 million people [58].
Poor farming households fail to undertake a profitable investment such as a communal
reservoir that they could, in principle, self-finance because the non-divisibility of the invest-
ment puts it out the their reach. If returns to savings are low, they may find it diﬃcult
to accumulate enough wealth to finance a large non-divisible investment, even if it is highly
profitable. Households thus appear trapped in poverty: because their income is low, they are
too concerned about their immediate survival to accumulate much, they never manage to have
enough to undertake such investments, and they remain poor [60]. Irreversibility constitutes
an additional disincentive to invest. The poverty trap issue demands government interventions
to improve financial credit markets and subsidize construction of irrigation infrastructure.
2.3 Urban Migration
The persistent problems of the spatial concentration of industry in urban centers, especially
Bangkok, lead to regional economic inequalities and severe urban congestion and pollution.
Farmers move to urban areas during dry seasons, imposing costly burdens on urban adminis-
tration and generating sprawl. Furthermore, arable fields are left uncultivated. In addition to
economic losses, many believe that urbanization and migration have splintered family relations
and social cohesion in villages.
Rural employment is limited, which has spurred a massive out-migration of young workers
to urban centers. The average annual migration rate increased from 420,000 workers in 1976-
1980 (of which 80 percent was seasonal) to 992,000 in 1991-1996 (of which 70 percent was
permanent) [59]. As a result, the number of employed persons in agriculture dropped from
20.5 million in 1989 to 16.9 million in 1995, mainly from the ranks of 12-24 years old. These
labor dynamics reflect several factors: the higher wages oﬀered by the fast growing industrial
and manufacturing sectors in urban areas during the 1990s and the limited productive capacity
of agriculture, primarily due to scarce land and water resources. After the 1997 economic
crisis, remigration back to rural areas has led to increased pressure on natural resources, and
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greater competition for agricultural land and limited oﬀ-farm employment.
2.4 Inequitable Distribution
In addition to growing income inequality between industrial and agricultural sectors [106],
inequality also exists within the agricultural sector. Some inequality simply emerges from
physical heterogeneity: fields with upstream riparian access can take full advantage of a “first-
come, first-served” water allocation arrangement. On the other hand, many inequalities are
results of institutional defects or political bias. For example, decisions as to who receives the
benefit from an agricultural subsidy are sometimes arbitrary, and the disparity in irrigation
water prices is not justified. Currently water allocation is done through command and con-
trol. Actual allocations are strongly influenced by political factors and are widely seen as
inequitable.
2.5 Poverty Trap
Government intervention is called for to help the poor escape from the poverty trap and pre-
vent unnecessary urban migration. Several policy options including irrigation investments and
direct cash subsidy compete for a share of a limited government agricultural budget. This
government policy must satisfy several political goals including equitable distribution, preser-
vation of agrarian society, and environmental protection. The government urgently needs to
establish an integrated, prioritized development strategy for small-scale irrigated agricultural
communities.
Government intervention should account for farmers’ preferences and local experiences
rather than follow conventional “command and control” schemes. Farmers are already re-
structuring their production in response to market signals. The key action should be to allow
farmer’s autonomy in production decisions. The government must provide more eﬀective
management of scarce water resources and oﬀer technology recommendations without forcing
adoption.
25
Chapter 3
Study Site & Modelling Approach
Given the agricultural problems outlined in Chapter 2, it is crucial that farmer’s decision-
making process be modelled accurately so that the government can understand the farmer’s
response to government intervention and thus select the appropriate policy. In order for a
modelling approach to be feasible we need to simplify and narrow the model’s scope to focus
on a few alternatives.
This chapter provides background on the study site and its current situations regarding
agricultural facilities, subsidies, pricing, and management. We then consider how the water
management problem for this site can be formulated. We outline a solution based on two
models which take, respectively, the perspective of an individual farmer and a government
planner. We conclude by describing public (government) and private (farmer) management
options.
3.1 Study Site
Location
We use the semi-rural area in Saraburi Province in the central region of Thailand as our study
site. The area is on the northeastern edge of an extensive rice-growing region, the Noi-Lopburi
floodplain, approximately 8 kilometers north of the main district of Saraburi Province. The
watershed area of our study site occupies roughly 4.3 square kilometers; this area is shown as
site B in Figure 3-2. The area’s terrain is relatively flat with slopes of less than 3◦, except for
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scattered limestone outcrops up in the north. It is situated approximately 15 meters above
mean sea level (MSL).
The study area consists of roughly 100 small-scale farming households who own their lands
(non-sharecropping) and generally cultivate on a subsistence basis. A typical subsistence farmer
in Saraburi area has, on average, a land-holding area of 15 rai1 or 2.40 hectare. The non-crop
area such as housing and walkways constitutes roughly 5% of the total land.
From our interviews with local farmers, the area grew rice almost exclusively until the last
decade when some farmers changed to maize for animal feeds in order to avoid the adverse
eﬀects of dry spells. The area further north of the Royal Study Center has somewhat diﬀerent
soil and is devoted mostly to maize cultivation. The entire zone is categorized as semi-rural:
the area is within close proximity to the provincial main district, and its economic activities
are connected to the town’s demand.
Agricultural Practices
The type of crop that can be grown is constrained by the soil’s nutrients. Rice seems to be a
prominent commercial crop in the study area since it is not as adversely aﬀected by poor soil
nutrients as other cash and field crops [88]. However, as farmers have applied more fertilizers,
the nutrient constraint has naturally reduced.
In addition to rice and maize, most farmers keep a small vegetable garden or an orchard
of perennial fruit trees. The produce is largely for domestic consumption. The commercial
value of other field crops such as soybeans, cassava, sorghum, and sugarcane is being studied
by Department of Agricultural Extensions and introduced to farmers in the area. Some farms
are starting to adopt cultivation of these crops.
Meteorological Variation
Agricultural drought may be defined as an unfavorable water balance for optimum crop pro-
duction. Since diﬀerent crops require diﬀerent soil-water regimes for optimum yields, drought
problems must be looked at in relation to the crops to be grown. Most often, rainfall vari-
ation and unpredictability aﬀect rainfed lowland rice yields more than the shortage of water
1Rai is a Thai measure unit of area, equivalent to 0.16 hectare.
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Study Area
Figure 3-1: Location of the study area in Chaleom Phrakiat District, Saraburi Province, Thai-
land.
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Figure 3-2: Site B illustrates the watershed area, downstream of Huai Hin Khao reservoir. The
natural channel located south of the reservoir is called Huai Hin Khao. Our hypothetical farm
replicates characteristics of the Pimsan farm shown as the red star.
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does in aggregate sense. In Thailand, even with the high concentrations of rainfall events
during the main rice season, rainfed rice in many areas and in most years suﬀers from in-season
drought and consequent loss of yield. The extent of such variations for Saraburi province in
the central region of Thailand is shown in Figure 3-3. Such a situation gives farmers little
choice but to adopt a very low-risk, low-input cropping system, which is directed to giving
stable rather than high production. Water shortage prevents most farmers from growing a
non-rice cash/commercial crop during the post-rice season. Even a marginal improvement in
the soil-water status in this season can make a significant diﬀerence in cropping opportunity
and/or yields.
Figure 3-3: Rainfall distribution and variability common to the semi-arid areas in the cen-
tral region of Thailand. Source: 1961-1997 daily precipitation from Phraputtabaht Weather
Station, Saraburi Province. Royal Irrigation Department.
Water Resources
Lack of water is often identified as the major constraint to agricultural production in the
Saraburi region. Many projects, including construction of water storage and on-farm water
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harvesting facilities, have been introduced to remedy the water scarcity problem. Huai Hin
Khao reservoir was constructed by the Royal Development Project Board and Royal Irrigation
Department in 1995 to collect runoﬀ from the upstream catchment area and limestone outcrops.
Farms in the study site replenish their ponds through a gravity-driven pipeline network from
Huai Hin Khao reservoir. The on-farm ponds capture in situ rainfall as well as runoﬀ generated
near and on the farm. Hand-dug ponds can reportedly reach no deeper than 4-6 meters due
to a limestone layer which lies near the surface.
Local groundwater is unsuitable for crop use due to its low yield and high heavy metal
concentrations. Further complicating the matter are the legal issues surrounding groundwater
regulation. The usage of groundwater for irrigation is regulated through a well licensing
system. Users are granted an entitlement by the Department of Mineral Resources to pump
a fixed volume of water per year. However, since the pumped amount is diﬃcult to monitor,
the groundwater system is at high risk of overuse. In addition to this common pool problem,
there is a widespread fear that high usage of well water upstream may lead to the flow of
saline groundwater into downstream regions, particularly the Bangkok area. As a result, the
government has imposed a moratorium on the issuing of new pumping allocations.2
3.2 Current Irrigation Facilities and Management
Traditional irrigation practice advocates large-scale irrigation facilities. Larger scale provides
more smoothing of temporal fluctuations in water supply. Several options for water storage
transfer such as large-scale dams and trans-basin diversion schemes for the Central Plain area
have been under study intermittently for several years, but these schemes are very costly and
likely to involve significant environmental and social risks [85]. In response, the government
has explored community-scale (medium-sized) and farm-scale (small-sized) storage facilities.
These two types of irrigation facilities can be categorized by their ownership.
2A detailed description on geophysical and agricultural charateristics of the study site can be found in Amorn-
vivat (2002).
31
3.2.1 Public Water Infrastructure
Huai Hin Khao Reservoir was completed and in operation in 1995 to provide water supply
initially to experimental fields in the Wat Mongkol Chaipattana Development Project area.
The reservoir has a tributary watershed of 90 square kilometers with a maximum water surface
area of 378,000 square meters. The capacity of the reservoir is 880,306 cubic meters. [79]
From the Reservoir, a gravity-driven water pipeline system has been built to supply the
areas of the Royal Development Project and local farmers’ fields. Currently the irrigation
water is provided to 30 beneficiary farms free of charge. The construction of the pipelines was
fully funded by the government. The operation is under the “command and control” practice
such that the Royal Irrigation Department oﬃcial determines when and how much free water
is delivered to each farm.
Figure 3-4: Picture of Haui Hin Khao reservoir at Chaloem Phrakiat District, Saraburi Province.
The spillway releases water to downhill fields in the Royal Development Study Center.
The Huai Hin Khao Channel Improvement Project, constructed by the Department of Ac-
celerated Rural Department, lies downstream of the reservoir. This project was finished in
1993. It provides enhanced in-stream storage through deepening and widening of the channel.
The project’s construction cost is substantially cheaper than Huai Hin Khao reservoir owing to
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Figure 3-5: Storage volume and surface area curves for Huai Hin Khao reservoir. Source: Royal
Irrigation Department.
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its smaller capacity and the lack of coerced or voluntary relocation for local residents. The wa-
tershed area tributary to the in-stream storage facility is 8 square kilometers with a maximum
water surface area of 36,400 square meters. The capacity of the enhanced in-stream storage is
82,810 cu.m. (approximately one tenth of the Huai Hin Khao reservoir’s capacity) [23].
Currently only 10-15 adjacent farms benefit from the free irrigation water provided by the
enhanced in-stream storage. In contrast to the reservoir’s operation, these farmers can pump
water from the canal without being monitored. Better management is needed for irrigation
sustainability and more equitable access to water supply.
Figure 3-6: Picture of Huai Hin Khoa stream before the Channel Improvement Project. Source:
Royal Development Projects Board.
3.2.2 Private Water Infrastructure
His Majesty’s New Theory suggests that construction of small on-farm ponds can supply the
water needed to sustain crops through dry periods. The theory has been demonstrated at the
Wat Mongkol Chaipattana Royal Projects Study Site, where a system of more than 20 small
ponds is fed by water from the Huai Hin Khao reservoir. The operation of these ponds is fully
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monitored by the Royal Development Projects Board for experimental purposes [15].
Farms outside of the Royal Projects Study Center’s boundary also adopt on-farm water
harvesting and storage. These small impoundments are not directly connected to the Huai
Hin Khao reservoir supply system. Interviews with the local farmers indicate that much of the
water in the pond is generated locally and that the pond usually hold enough water to insure
crop yields during the wet season. The construction of such a pond is currently paid for by the
Royal Development Projects Board or by private sponsors through the agency. The agency
specifies the size of the pond [53].
Figure 3-7: Private water infrastructure such as this on-farm pond can be either self-financed
by a farmer or subsidized by the government. Source: Royal Development Projects Board.
3.3 Problem Formulation
The objectives of this research are to correctly model the farmer’s decision-making process and
to identify optimum government policy. In order to do so, we need to simplify reality and
narrow the model’s scope to a few alternatives. The following discussions outline the model’s
assumptions and describe management options available to the government and to the farmers.
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They also indicate how the public and private choices interact.
3.3.1 Economic Assumptions
Income and Expenses
To satisfy crop water demand, we suppose that farmers can purchase irrigation water from
public sources or invest in a private storage facility. In addition to irrigation-related costs,
farmers are also subject to production costs including soil preparation, seed, and fertilizer. We
assume that the unit prices of farming produce remain fixed throughout the time horizon. The
model therefore assumes that the farmers play a price-taker role. That is, their actions cannot
change the market equilibrium. We assume that each farmer sells all farming products and
purchases all he consumes; domestic consumption is not accounted for in this model.
As an occupational alternative to farming, the farmer can work in town, earning a minimum
wage for the entire growing season. He decides to seek an oﬀ-farm job only when he anticipates
that the net farming income will be lower than the wage he earns with certainty. Once the
farmer commits to stay on-farm at the beginning of a growing season, he cannot change his
mind to work oﬀ-farm in the middle of that season. These assumptions are reasonable and
simplify our analysis.
Welfare
Each individual farmer maximizes his discounted utility of consumption. While his wealth does
not directly contribute to his utility level, it allows him the flexibility to tap into his savings
during times of unexpected financial distress. The farmer’s utility in our case depends on his
rate of time preference3 and his attitude towards risk.
Farmers are perceived to be risk averse. That is, they are willing to accept less revenue
in order to reduce risk. In the context of agriculture, farmers are willing to invest in water
storage infrastructure if such investment can suﬃciently reduce the uncertainty of crop yields.
Or they may choose to work in town to sustain more stable incomes.4
3Namely, the discount rate.
4The summary of economic parameters is located in Appendix B.
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3.3.2 Source of Uncertainty
In our modelling approach, risk is derived only from meteorological variation. The meteorolog-
ical variables for our model are daily precipitation, pan evaporation, maximum and minimum
temperature. Meteorological variability is responsible for fluctuations in crop yields, crop-water
requirements, and inflows to water storage facilities. Although the farmer is also subject to
fluctuations in product prices, wages and interest rates over time, reality shows that his income
fluctuation is aﬀected most by meteorological uncertainty [74].
From our 35 years of daily meteorological series from 1961-1995 5, we perform several
statistical tests: regression and spectral analyses. The results of these tests show an obvious
seasonal cycle but no statistically significant inter-annual trends or cycles. Therefore, we can
safely assume that precipitation and pan evaporation are uncorrelated from year to year.
3.3.3 The Government’s Management Decisions
3.3.3.1 Program Options
In light of the Saraburi site, we specify four possible irrigation programs: (1) a communal
reservoir, (2) in-stream storage, (3) an on-farm pond, and (4) a direct cash subsidy.
The communal reservoir and the in-stream storage are public facilities shared by a group of
beneficiary farms. Access may be granted by the government or as a result of the farm’s natural
riparian location. The government generally subsidies the construction cost of public storage
facilities. In turn, the farmers may also contribute by paying a fixed unit price for water drawn
from such facilities. Our farm-level model uses water price as an exogenous input to derive
irrigation demand. The government decides on how many farms are served and how much unit
price of water is charged by each facility. The capacity of each facility option sets a limit to
how much water a beneficiary farm can divert. In our model the farmers cannot choose the
size of public storage facilities. This restriction is due to the fact that the feasibility of these
large-scale infrastructures is practically limited by hydrology and availability of appropriate
5Agroclimatological data was obtained from two closest stations operated under Meteorological Department:
Muang District, Saraburi (station 414001, 14◦31´N and 100◦56´E and Phu Khae Botanical Garden (station 414012,
14◦40´N and 100◦55´E). Daily series are available for 46 years (1952-1997) of rainfall; 17 years (1982-1998) of
Class-A pan evaporation; 38 years (1961-1998) of temperature.
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sites.
Communal Reservoir
Surface impoundments such as reservoirs and lakes (both natural and man-made) help to sup-
plement the available water resource during dry seasons. The storage of surface water reservoirs
is the most well-developed mechanism for water storage and is being used extensively in Thai-
land to provide and stabilize water supplies for many purposes including irrigation. However,
the environmental impacts of such projects may be unacceptable. The reservoir considered in
this model is intended solely for irrigation use.
Huai Hin Khao Reservoir serves as an example of a communal reservoir. Instead of the
current “command and control” operation, the model lets the farmer decide the quantity of
water purchased at a given price level, provided that the farmers’ aggregate demand does not
exceed the reservoir’s capacity. This self-determination in the model allows us to investigate
the demand-side response to water price.
Enhanced In-stream Storage
In-stream storage is obtained by enlarging a natural stream in order to increase the amount of
stored water available to meet demands during droughts. Enhancement of in-stream storage
around the world has long been recognized as a technically valid concept. This type of facility
could, in some cases, also enhance the recharge of ground water systems that underlie them.
Enhanced in-stream storage in our model is modelled after Huai Hin Khao Channel Im-
provement Project. Our model assumes that the in-stream storage is managed similarly to
the reservoir. That is, all beneficiary farmers—with and without riparian access—determine
irrigation demand while being constrained by the storage’s capacity.
There are some problems concerning the implementation of a public water infrastructure.
Monitoring ineﬃciency may result in a “tragedy of the commons” problem, meaning that no
individual processes exclusive rights to exploit the resource. This can lead to overexploitation
of the water supply. Furthermore, assignment of access rights can be strongly influenced by
political factors and widely seen as inequitable.
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On-farm Pond
An individual farmer may choose to build his own pond to avoid the problem of common
pool property arising with the use of external storage facilities. Apart from the possibility of
overexploitation, the pond also has the advantage of providing free irrigation water. Despite
its smaller capacity and consequent inability to prevent water shortage during severe droughts,
the on-farm pond can mitigate some risk with a relatively small investment.
The farmer faces a trade-oﬀ between water supply reliability and pond-associated costs.
Such costs include the pond’s maintenance cost and the loss of agricultural land used for the
pond. In our modelling approach, the government provides a specified construction cost sub-
sidy. Remaining costs are amortized into the farmer’s seasonal expenses.
We discretize the on-farm pond into three sizes: 5%, 10%, and 15% of the farmer’s total
land-holding area. The pond subsidy, the amount of subsidy available for pond construction, is
used as an exogenous input to the farm-level model. In turn, the farm-level model determines
the pond size the farmer wishes to install and predicts his associated utility and behavioral
response.
Figure 3-8 illustrates possible water storage options considered in our model. The communal
reservoir is located uphill and connected to a number of individual farms (or on-farm ponds)
through a network of gravity-driven pipelines. In addition, running through the farming area is
a natural stream which has no irrigation potential until widening. Since all farms are assumed
to be identical, they face similar distance and cost to divert water from either external storage
facilities to their own farms. The government decides on the construction and the pricing
scheme for these two public water infrastructure. The farmers, on the other hand, determine
the quantity of water purchased from public storage facilities. As an alternative to the public
infrastructure, a farmer can opt to install an on-farm pond to store water harvested within
his farm’s boundary. The farmer is responsible for the pond’s maintenance cost and for the
construction cost additional to the government’s pond subsidy if the pond is bigger than the
government-specified size. Results discussed in Chapter 5 indicate that farmers at our study
site will never spend more on pond construction than is provided by the government subsidy.
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Figure 3-8: Conceptual diagram of the water storage facilities
Cash Subsidy
As alternative to the three irrigation schemes outlined above, we also include in our analysis
a direct cash subsidy. If the cash subsidy performs better than the aforementioned irrigation
schemes (i.e. if it yields higher aggregate utility and meets all political objectives), it is better
for the government to give cash to the farmers.
3.3.3.2 Policy Choices
Figure 3-9 summarizes the possible government programs. All of the farms being considered
may not necessarily receive the same mix of government subsidized program. For example, 40
farms out of 100 may be granted access to communal reservoir water at 3.5 baht/cu.m. The
remaining 60 farms may receive a subsidy for a 5% pond and free in-stream storage water. The
cash subsidy is distributed evenly among 100 farms.
The model allows the farmer to divert water from available external storage facilities to store
in the on-farm pond. This feature enables a synergy between public and on-farm infrastructure
options. This interaction may make having shared infrastructure more attractive than either
type constructed alone.
Under current operation, the reservoir serves 30 farms at a water price equal to zero and
the government pays for ponds whose sizes are specified by the farmers. In general, the farmer
tends to choose too big a pond because he does not bear its construction cost. Therefore, land
and the government subsidy may both be utilized ineﬃciently.
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Figure 3-9: Government’s policy options in our model consist of four program options—(1)
management of the communal reservoir, (2) management of the enhanced in-stream storage,
(3) pond installation, (4) direct cash subsidy. These combinations include the nominal policy
and five alternatives.
In this study, we identify the combination (or mix) of the four government programs that
maximizes aggregate utility over all farms subject to specified policy constraints.
3.3.4 Farmers’ Management Decisions
A risk-averse farmer seeks to optimize his expected utility of consumption while balancing ex-
pected income and risk of income fluctuation. Such a farmer faces two sets of decisions: (1)
long-run decisions and (2) real-time decisions, as diagrammed in Figure 3-10. The irreversible
long-run decision is made at the beginning of time horizon, depending on long-term average
meteorology. Real-time decisions are made each growing season, depending on actual meteo-
rology. Our farm-level model uses a discrete-time optimal control method to find the farmer’s
optimum decision considering the exogenous inputs such as water price, the existence of the
water storage facilities, and the number of farms sharing the storage supply.
3.3.4.1 Long-run Decision
The farmer’s long-run decision on pond construction is irreversible and optimized over the
entire time horizon. Once he installs an on-farm pond of a certain size, he forgoes that area of
otherwise productive land. A farmer decides whether and what size of a pond to build. For
modelling purposes we discretize the pond size into 3 levels: 5%, 10%, and 15% of the farmer’s
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Figure 3-10: Farmer’s decision variables: (1) long-run decision on pond construction and (2)
real-time decisions on land/labor allocation and consumption.
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total land-holding area.
The farmer also has an option not to build a pond. When the water from a public storage
facility is available at a suﬃciently low price, the farmer may be better oﬀ purchasing supple-
mental irrigation water than sacrificing land and incurring the pond’s maintenance costs.
3.3.4.2 Real-time Decisions
Unlike the long-run decision, the farmer optimizes his real-time strategies in each period in
response to the current state and his knowledge of the future uncertainty. His real-time
decisions include (1) farming versus oﬀ-farm employment, (2) crop selection and irrigation
strategies, (3) quantity of water purchased from external storage, and (4) consumption spending.
The mathematical model specified in the farmer’s decision making process is formulated as a
discrete-time optimal control problem. Thus, these decisions change over time in response to
changing meteorological inputs.
• Oﬀ-farm Employment
At the beginning of each growing season the farmer chooses either to seek oﬀ-farm employ-
ment for the entire 4-month planting period or to grow crops. If he decides to work oﬀ-farm,
he will obtain a certain specified wage. Otherwise, he will obtain agricultural income which is
subject to fluctuations in meteorology.
• Farm Management
If the farmer works on-farm, he has three choices of crop: rice, maize, and soybeans, and
three choices of irrigation strategy: rainfed, mid-range irrigation, and full irrigation. Hence
there is a total of nine farm management combinations from which the farmer can choose to
maximize his net income. More details of these farm management options are described in
Chapter 4 on the CROP submodel.
• Water Purchases
The farmer must satisfy the water demands of the crops and corresponding irrigation strate-
gies he chooses. The farmer has an option to let the crop fail when his operating cost (irrigation
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water) exceeds the maximum expected seasonal revenue. Since the model assumes all farmers
are identical, they purchase equal amounts of water from public facilities.
• Consumption
In addition to agricultural management decisions, the farmer sets aside his consumption
expense at the beginning of the period. His consumption level includes food as well as all other
goods and services he purchases for his household. The model assumes that the farmer sells
all of his agricultural inputs and buys his food oﬀ-farm. This consumption expense is taken
from his wealth level at the beginning of each time period. Net farming income (i.e., revenue
minus expense) as well as wage-earning income are added in the wealth level at the beginning
of the next period.
Figure 3-11: Inflows and outflows of wealth from computed states at time t and applied over
(t, t+ 1).
Wealth or savings in our discrete-time optimization model serves as a state variable. Figure
3-11 shows inflows and outflows of wealth generated from the economic activities that take place
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within one period (a 4-month season, in this case.) A risk-averse farmer is likely to keep a
precautionary saving so that he can tap into his liquid wealth during income shortfalls.
3.3.5 Public-Private Interaction
The two previous sections outline the public options and the private choices modelled in our
study. We now explain the government-level model which chooses the optimal irrigation policy,
the farm-level model which predicts the farmer’s response to the policy, and the interaction
between the two models.
3.3.5.1 Government-level Model
The government’s policy optimization maximizes the farmers’ aggregate utility by implementing
the optimal combination of the agricultural programs listed in Section 3.3.3.1 and shown in
Figure 3-9. The government may (1) fully subsidize the construction of the public storage
facilities, providing water deliveries to a specific number of farms and charging a specific unit
water price, (2) choose the amount of pond subsidy, and (3) distribute cash to each farmer.
In turn, the government model relies on the farm-level model that determines how individual
small farmers will react to the mix of government programs provided. While the government
sees policy alternatives as decision variables, the farmers consider them exogenous inputs over
which they have no control. These exogenous inputs are assumed to be discrete in our model
formulation.
The government’s policy optimization process is constrained by budget limitation and site
constraints. For instance, hydrologic characteristics determine the feasibility and the capacity
of the storage infrastructures. In addition, the physical restrictions of the site dictate the
number of beneficiary farms.
In addition to budget and physical constraints, the government-level model needs to satisfy
specific political criteria. Examples of the political criteria are :
1. A social optimum criterion where the maximum total utility is achieved;
2. A equal distribution criterion which requires that all beneficiary farmers receive identical
treatment;
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3. An agrarian society criterion which insures that all farmers are given enough incentives
to work exclusively on-farm; and
4. A reservoir restriction which applies when the reservoir construction is too politically
diﬃcult to undertake.
This government-level model identifies the set of subsidies and water pricing policies that
yields the highest utility of all farmers, meets all constraints, and satisfies some of the political
criteria specified above.
Figure 3-12: Interaction between the government’s policy optimization and the individual
farmer’s decision-making models.
3.3.5.2 Farm-level Model
In response to each policy scenario defined by the government-level model, the farm-level model
maximizes the individual farmer’s utility subject to uncertain meteorological inputs and hydro-
logic and economic constraints. The farmer then makes decisions on how to manage his time,
crops, and expenses.
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This farm-level model is composed of three submodels: HYDRO, CROP, and ECON. The
hydrologic submodel (HYDRO) generates runoﬀ to each of the storage facilities (e.g., on-farm
ponds of three sizes, the communal reservoir, and the in-stream storage). The agronomic
submodel (CROP) simulates crop growth and water requirement for diﬀerent crop types and
irrigation strategies. The economic submodel (ECON) keeps track of wealth and of water avail-
able to agriculture and derives the farmer’s decisions that maximize the utility of consumption.
The farm-level model’s outputs required by the government-level model include (1) individual
utility as a result of the policy implementation, (2) quantity of the water purchased from the
public water facilities, and (3) the amount of time the farmer works oﬀ-farm.
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Chapter 4
Hydrologic-Economic Model of
Farmer’s Decision-Making Process
The success of an agricultural development program depends critically on farmers’ responses to
specific policies. The hydrologic-economic model described in this chapter simulates an individ-
ual farmer’s management decisions for various government policies. The farmer’s management
decisions derived from our model deal with pond installation, cropping and irrigation strategies,
oﬀ-farm employment, quantity of external water purchased, and consumption. Government
policies that influence the farmer’s decisions include water pricing, the number of farms sharing
external storage facilities, and pond and cash subsidies.
Our farm-level model consists of three submodels: (1) a hydrologic submodel that simulates
the runoﬀ to diﬀerent water storage facilities; (2) an agronomy submodel that simulates the
eﬀect of weather and farm management on crop yields; and (3) an economic model that identifies
the decisions which maximize the farmer’s utility. We begin with an overview of this integrated
approach. Then we discuss diﬀerent methods for dealing with the stochastic aspects of the
farmer’s welfare-maximization problem. Finally, we provide detailed discussions of the three
submodels.
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4.1 Integrated Framework
An individual farmer’s decision-making process under uncertainty calls for an integrated frame-
work that captures the interaction between hydrology, agronomy, and microeconomics. Ex-
ogenous policy variables which aﬀect the farmer’s decisions include water price and the number
of farms sharing facilities. Resource limitations on land, labor and capital as well as the min-
imum (subsistence) consumption requirement also constrain the farmer’s choices. It is also
necessary to consider other economic factors such as attitude toward risk, opportunity cost of
labor, rate of time preference and bank’s interest rate. Finally, meteorological variability must
be accounted for.
Figure 4-1: The overall approach of the farm-level model consists of three submodels: HYDRO,
CROP and ECON. All three submodels share soil properties, metheological and hydrological
inputs.
Figure 4-1 illustrates how our farm-level model integrates all of these factors. The model
consists of three submodels :
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• Runoﬀ-generating submodel - HYDRO. This hydrologic submodel simulates weekly
runoﬀ to both public and private water infrastructures.
• Crop simulation submodel - CROP. The crop simulation submodel computes crop-
water requirements and crop yields for diﬀerent combinations of crop type, irrigation
strategy, and planting date.
• Welfare maximization submodel - ECON. This economic submodel simulates the
farmer’s decision-making process given diﬀerent policy scenarios.
The three submodels share site-specific properties and meteorological inputs. Our inte-
grated model captures the eﬀect of weather variation by using 35 years of daily historic mete-
orological data from 1961 to 1995. Each of the 35 annual records is defined to be a particular
“state of nature” (n), represented as pink blocks in Figure 4-2.
We run all scenarios in the CROP and the HYDRO submodels repeatedly with each of the
35 states of nature. For example, the CROP submodel derives seasonal crop yields and weekly
crop-water requirement for 3 crop types, 3 irrigation strategies, and 3 planting dates for each
of the 35 states of nature. The HYDRO submodel derives pond water inflows for three pond
sizes and external storage inflows for the reservoir and the enhanced in-stream storage for each
of the 35 states of nature. All of these CROP and HYDRO outputs are stored in data files for
subsequent use by the ECON submodel.
The ECON submodel accounts for uncertainty in water inflows by adopting a dynamic
programming framework. Ideally, stochastic dynamic programming should be used for this
problem. However, this method imposes a huge computational burden for the large number
of dimensions in our problem. Instead, we solve the welfare optimization problem by using
deterministic discrete-time dynamic programming. To make computational eﬀort feasible, each
year of a given 8-year sequence (represented as yellow blocks in Figure 4-2) is sampled at random
with replacement from the set of 35 states of nature (represented as yellow blocks in Figure 4-
2.) Each resulting 8-year sequence is equally likely to occur. The results of spectral statistical
tests performed on the 35-year recorded weather series show no significant inter-annual trend
or cycle. We assign the length of time horizon to 8 years due to the limited computational
power.
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Figure 4-2: Stochastic dynamic setting of the ECON submodel : There are 10 sequences (s) of
8 years (y) each. We sample the 35 states of nature (n) with replacement to each year (y) in
each sequence (s). One year consists of 3 seasons (r): DEC, APR, and AUG.
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The ECON submodel optimizes the individual farmer’s welfare across a set of 10 eight-year
sequence. The information associated with a particular year (y) in a sequence (s) is retrieved
by using the corresponding state of nature index (n). We can illustrate by using the diagram
in Figure 4-2. The second year (y = 2) in the second sequence (s = 2) is assigned the fifth
state of nature (n = 5). In all three seasons within that particular year (s = 2, y = 2), the
ECON submodel retrieves data derived from the CROP or the HYDRO submodels as well as
meteorological information associated with the state of nature index (n = 5).
4.2 Crop Simulation Submodel - CROP
4.2.1 Objectives and Scope
Crop simulation programs enable policy makers, farmers and other decision makers to assess
the consequences of management actions today on crop yield in the future. By allowing users
to explore the future, a crop model makes it possible to choose those actions which are more
likely to produce desirable outcomes. Here, the crop simulation submodel computes crop-
water requirements and crop yields given soil composition and local cultivation practices for
each particular crop.
Many crop simulation programs are available commercially for agricultural research and
development projects. The crop simulation package used in this research is called Decision
Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT). DSSAT is a collection of crop models
and computer programs integrated into a single software package in order to facilitate the
application of crop simulation models in research and decision making. This software is a
product of the International Bench-mark Sites Network for Agrotechnology Transfer (IBSNAT)
project and is widely used in agricultural planing and agronomic research. The DSSAT system
consists of several components: (1) crop models; (2) soil and weather data; (3) collaborators’
experimental data; and (4) application programs to enter and retrieve data, link the models
with site and experimental data files, and analyze the observed and simulated data for specific
objectives.
The crop models of interest here are CERES-Rice, CERES-Maize, and CROPGRO-Soybean,
which simulate crop growth for the study site’s local cultivars of lowland transplanted rice,
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maize, and soybeans, respectively [99, lists in pp 97-98, vol.2 the developers of the crop models,
CERES and CROPGRO, used in DSSAT]. These crop models can predict the yields and
the water requirements of the corresponding crop types under diﬀerent farm management and
agroclimatic scenarios.
In our application, water demand per unit of land is calculated weekly for all combinations
of crop type, irrigation strategy, planting period, and state of nature. This output tells how
much water is required to cultivate a unit area of a particular plot. The other output is
seasonal crop yield per unit area, dictating the crop productivity the farmer will obtain from
each combination of decisions and a state of nature. These outputs are used by the ECON
submodel.
Figure 4-3: Structure of CROP submodel
53
4.2.2 Structure and Computation
The CROP submodel translates weather into yield and water requirement. The crop models
in DSSAT simulate phasic growth for each crop as well as the water budget in the root zone.
The plant’s phasic development is phenological growth stages as influenced by genotype and
environmental factors. The stages range from sowing to harvest. The following are the main
processes simulated in the model: (1) growth and development, (2) biomass production and
partitioning, (3) root system dynamics, (4) eﬀect of soil water deficit and nitrogen deficiency
on the photosynthesis and photosynthate partitioning in the plant system, and (5) water and
nitrogen budgets at the surface and in the root zone.
The DSSAT crop models relate transpiration and growth to soil water content rather than
to leaf water potential. When the plant senses that its environment is deteriorating, it adjusts
its growth rate accordingly. That means the growth rate determines the rate of photosynthesis.
[67] These models also assume that the water flow is one-dimensional. In addition, potentially
growth-limiting factors such as pests, weeds and diseases are completely controlled so that they
have no adverse eﬀect on yield. Appendix D provides detailed discussions of these simulation
processes which are common to all three DSSAT crop models used in our study.
Figure 4-3 shows the inputs and outputs of the CROP submodel as summarized below.
CROP Inputs
Our CROP submodel is actually a collection of inputs for three of the DSSAT crop models:
CERES-Rice, CERES-Maize, and CROPGRO-Soybean; each of which simulates crop growth
for rice, maize, and soybeans, respectively. The DSSAT crop simulation software requires the
following inputs:
• Soil initial conditions and properties, listed in Table 4.1
• Daily solar radiation, maximum and minimum air temperature, and precipitation for
duration of cropping season
• Management practices such as cultivar selection, plant density, planting date, irrigation
strategy, and fertilization application
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• Latitude of the production area to evaluate day length during the cropping season
• Variety-specific coeﬃcients that account for diﬀerences in the response of diﬀerent geno-
types to environmental factors. [99, page 220, Vol 2]
In our CROP submodel, all meteorological and soil inputs are based on data from the
Saraburi study site (global positioning coordinate: 14◦34´N and 100◦55´E). Soil properties for
the area is listed in Table 4.1. [1, provides a more detailed description of the study site’s soil
properties.]
Depth from surface 0-1 m below 1 m
pH 7.6 7.8
EC at 25◦C [millihos] 0.113 0.075
Organic Matter [%] 1.24 0.64
P [ppm] 2 1
K [ppm] 20 15
CEC [me/100gm] 9.5 6.5
Bulk Density [gm/cc] 1.78 2.36
Particle Density 2.17 2.17
Porosity [%] 34.32 13.56
Electrical Conductivity (EC) is water’s ability to conduct an electrical current
and is directly related to the concentration of dissolved salts. The greater
the EC, the more dissolved salts are present in solution.
Cation Exchange Capacity (CEC) is an indication of the number of exchange
sites within a soil that may temporarily hold positively charged ions. It is
generally determined by the amount and type of clay and the amount of
organic matter.
Table 4.1: Soil properties for the Saraburi study site. Source: Department of Agriculture and
Royal Irrigation Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Agroclimatological data were obtained from two stations operated by the Meteorological
Department: Muang District, Saraburi (station 414001, 14◦31´N and 100◦56´E and Phu Khae
Botanical Garden (station 414012, 14◦40´N and 100◦55´E). Daily series are available for 46
years (1952-1997) of rainfall; 36 years (1960-1995) of solar radiation; and 38 years (1961-1998)
of temperature.
A particular combination of crop management practices is called a “treatment” in the
DSSAT program. We simulate a total of 27 treatments—including 3 crop types, 3 irriga-
tion strategies, and 3 planting dates—for each of the 35 states of nature. The farmer is given
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three crop choices (c): (1) rice, (2) maize, (3) soybeans. This crop selection has been suggested
as one of the nutrient-eﬃcient cropping patterns for the Lopburi/Saraburi area [25]. Local
cultivars for rice, maize, and soybeans are RD7 [52, DSSAT coeﬃcients derived for Thailand’s
local rice varieties], Suwan-1 [75, Personal interview], and PK-472 [61, Soybean varieties sug-
gested for the Central Plain region], respectively. Sources for genetic coeﬃcients used in the
corresponding crop model are [52] for RD7, [99, page 220] for Suwan-1, and [99, page 202-3] for
PK-472.
For each crop type, the farmer may assign an irrigation strategy of three practices (k): (1)
rainfed, (2) mid-range irrigation, (3) full irrigation. The rainfed cultivation option relies solely
on in situ precipitation. The full irrigation option demands as much water as the plant needs to
yield highest productivity; whereas, the mid-range irrigation option uses half of this amount.
The planting schedule is divided into three periods (p) starting: (1) Dec 1, (2) Apr 1, (3)
Aug 1. This scheduling naturally follows a 4-month meteorological cycle with the three planting
dates corresponding to: (1) beginning of the dry season, (2) after the mango-shower period, (3)
beginning of the rainy season, respectively.
Soil preparation, seeding procedures, and fertilizer application for each crop type follow
local practices. These management practices are identical across all irrigation strategies and
planting dates 1. The CROP submodel does not account for the adverse aﬀect of growth
limiting factors such as pests, weeds and diseases.
CROP Outputs
The CROP submodel computes two outputs: (1)weekly crop-water requirement (watdemcpkwn)
and (2) seasonal yield (yldcpkn) for each of the 27 treatments of the 35 states of nature. We
store these two multi-dimensional arrays in the CROP output files, which the ECON submodel
uses as inputs.
1 Information on cultivation practices and varieties is obtained from Field Crop Research Institute, Depart-
ment of Agriculture <www.fcri.doa.go.th/fcri> and personal interview with the oﬃcial from the Department of
Agricultural Extension [75, Personal interview].
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4.3 Runoﬀ Generation Submodel - HYDRO
4.3.1 Objectives and Scope
The HYDRO submodel simulates weekly water inflows to the communal reservoir, the in-stream
storage, and on-farm ponds. All facilities have the ability to carry storage over between seasons.
Without knowing the amount of water diverted to the farm in each season, we cannot compute
the water balance of these storage facilities inside of the HYDRO submodel. Instead, the
ECON submodel resumes the role of computing water balance in both a pond and a larger
storage facility.
The HYDRO submodel relies on the quantitative root zone water balance analysis provided
in DSSAT. The DSSAT program accounts for the eﬀects of infiltration and evapotranspiration
on runoﬀ. These processes also control the distribution and movement of water in the soil
column. DSSAT requires information on soil and plant properties as well as meteorological in-
puts. The DSSAT model derives daily water fluxes including infiltration, soil evaporation, plant
evapotranspiration, and runoﬀ. The outputs of DSSAT, tailored to our study site’s conditions,
are convenient to use for the computation of runoﬀ required by the HYDRO submodel.
In addition to the one-dimensional runoﬀ series from DSSAT, land use of the watershed
areas and in situ rainfall on the storage facilities determine the water inflow volumes. The
HYDRO submodel is run repeatedly for each of the 35 states of nature.
4.3.2 Mathematical Formulation
The HYDRO submodel is responsible for calculating runoﬀ to the water storage facilities of
interest. Such facilities include the on-farm pond of three sizes: 5%, 10%, and 15% of the
farmer’s land-holding area, as well as the communal reservoir and the enhanced in-stream
storage. The HYDRO submodel calculates the inflows to the public and private storage facilities
while the ECON submodel updates water storage in these facilities.
HYDRO Inputs
Below is a list of inputs required for runoﬀ calculation. The first three inputs are required by
DSSAT and also used in the CROP submodel. The HYDRO submodel needs additional land
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Figure 4-4: Structure of HYDRO submodel
58
use composition and the storage facilities’ surface and runoﬀ-collecting areas.
• Daily meteorological data : precipitation, solar radiation, minimum and maximum tem-
perature
• Soil initial conditions and properties, listed in Table 4.1
• Plant properties with respect to land use : lowland rice and maize
• Composition of land use within the runoﬀ collecting areas, listed in Table 4.2
• Water surface areas of the storage facilities, also listed in Table 4.2
We use the same set of agroclimatological records and soil properties for the Saraburi study
site as in the CROP submodel. The HYDRO submodel computes runoﬀ to each type of storage
facility repeatedly for the 35 states of nature (n). The state of nature index allows the ECON
submodel to retrieve the outputs derived by the HYDRO submodel.
Runoﬀ to the external storage facilities depends on the exact topography and hydrology of
the tributary watershed area. In our particular study case, we use the Huai Hin Khao reservoir
as a prototype for the communal reservoir and the Huai Hin Khao Channel Improving project
for the enhanced in-stream storage. Thus, the characteristics of their corresponding watersheds
are used to calculate runoﬀs in our study.
The land use of the runoﬀ-collecting areas is divided into three categories: (1) non-crop,
(2) rainfed rice, and (3) maize areas. The land use composition for the communal reservoir’s
watershed is obtained from the Huai Hin Khao reservoir’s feasibility study conducted by the
Royal Irrigation Department [79]. We extracted the land use information of the enhanced in-
stream storage’s runoﬀ-collecting area from the aerial photographs of the watershed tributary
to the Huai Hin Khao Channel Improving project.2 Table 4.2 summarizes the percentage of
land use types in the external storage facilities’ watershed areas.
Unlike the public storage facilities, the on-farm pond accumulates runoﬀ harvested exclu-
sively within the farm’s boundary. The pond’s runoﬀ-collecting area consists of (1) the non-crop
2The aerial photographs were taken by the Department of Lands on 11 December 1994, during the dry season
to insure high visibility.
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Storage Facility Surface Area Collecting Area Land Use (%)
[m2] [m2] Non-crop Rice Maize
Reservoir 378,000 90,000,000 57.0% 13.0% 30.0%
In-stream Storage 36,400 8,000,000 24.3% 32.1% 43.5%
5% Pond 1,200 22,800 5.3% 94.7% -
10% Pond 2,400 21,600 5.6% 94.4% -
15% Pond 3,600 20,400 5.9% 94.1% -
Table 4.2: Surface areas and land use of the runoﬀ-collecting areas for the diﬀerent water storage
facilities
area which is allocated for housing and walkways and (2) the cultivation area. The runoﬀ cal-
culation is complicated by the fact that the farmer practices the water harvesting, which routes
runoﬀ from fields to the pond. The HYDRO submodel assumes that all of the cultivation area
in each farm is devoted to rainfed rice. The validity of this assumption is explained later in
this section.
Table 4.2 shows the pond’s water surface area and runoﬀ-collecting area categorized by land
use type. Because the farm’s housing area constitutes 5% of the farmer’s total land-holding
area regardless of pond sizes, the ratio of the non-crop area to the runoﬀ-collecting area shrinks
as the pond expands.
The DSSAT program updates flux and storage estimates every day by accounting for tem-
poral variation in meteorology and crop-water demand. The one-dimensional daily runoﬀ
estimates from DSSAT (Ωdnl) enable us to compute runoﬀ from three types of land use (l) and
for 35 states of nature (n).
HYDRO Outputs
The HYDRO submodel calculates water inflows weekly for the on-farm pond (αiwn) and
seasonally for the reservoir and the enhanced in-stream storage (λjpn). These two
three-dimensional matrices are stored in the HYDRO output files in the format accessible by
the ECON submodel. Storages in external facilities, which have much longer memory than
the pond, fluctuate negligibly over weekly time scales. The seasonal time step of the external
water storage reduces computational demands.
Subscriptions Definition Unit
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i size of pond, i = 1, 2, 3 {05%,10%,15%}
j external storage facility types, j = 1, 2 {reservoir=1, in-
stream storage=2}
l land use type l = 1, 2, 3 {non-crop, rice, maize}
w week index, w = 1, ..., 52
p seasonal index, p = 1, 2, 3 {DEC, APR, AUG}
n states of nature, n = 1, ..., 35
d(.) runoﬀ period, d(w) = weekly and d(p) = seasonal
Variables :
αiwn inflow to a pond of size i during week w in the nth state of
nature
m3
λjpn inflow to an external facility j during season p in the nth
state of nature
m3
Precipdn precipitation within period d in the nth state of nature m
Ωdnl runoﬀ to land use type l within period d in the nth state of
nature [obtained from DSSAT]
m
SurfaceArea(i,j) surface area of pond size i or for external storage facility j m2
TotalRunoffArea(i,j) runoﬀ-collecting area of pond size i or for external storage
facility j
m2
x(i,j)l ratio of land use type l for pond size i or for external storage
facility j
Equations :
αiwn =
X
d(w)
"
Precipdn · SurfaceAreai +
3X
l=1
xil · TotalRunoffAreai · Ωdnl
#
(4.1)
λjpn =
X
d(p)
"
Precipdn · SurfaceAreaj +
3X
l=1
xjl · TotalRunoffAreaj · Ωdnl
#
(4.2)
Equations 4.1 and 4.2 compute the total water inflows by considering runoﬀ from the dif-
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ferent land uses within the runoﬀ-collecting area. The outputs of the HYDRO submodel are
the volume of weekly inflows to a pond of three sizes and the volume of seasonal inflows to the
two storage facilities for each of the 35 states of nature.
4.3.3 Model Assumptions
Our HYDRO submodel relies on the DSSAT program to carry out the water balance analysis
in a soil column and to derive runoﬀ for each specific land use. The DSSAT model calculates
intertemporal soil-water movement and storage by taking into account soil evaporation, plant
evapotranspiration, infiltration and groundwater recharge. The resulting runoﬀ summarizes the
aggregate eﬀects of these various processes and is convenient to use in the HYDRO submodel.
Soil characteristics are assumed to be uniform within all the runoﬀ-collecting areas. This
assumption is based on five soil samples collected from the study area and three from the
watershed tributary to the Huai Hin Khao reservoir. The eight soil samples, tested by Royal
Irrigation Department, exhibit similar compositions and properties as listed in Table 4.1.
The HYDRO submodel specifies identical initial soil conditions (e.g., soil moisture density,
organic matter component) for all 35 states of nature in DSSAT simulation. The initial
condition starts on January 1 of each year, which is in the middle of the dry season. This
assumption is accurate because the soil compartment is almost completely dry at the beginning
of every year (1961-1996).
In addition to identical soil properties and initial condition throughout the runoﬀ-collecting
areas, we assume that similar varieties and cultivation practices of lowland rice and maize are
employed. Local cultivars for rice and maize are RD7 and Suwan-1, respectively. Rainfed
cultivation is commonly observed in the watershed areas.
The on-farm pond accumulates runoﬀ harvested exclusively within the farm’s boundary.
Spill from the external storage does not contribute to the pond’s inflows. Since all farms are
identical, potential additional outflows from the adjacent farms are considered as loss.
For modelling purposes, we simplify the HYDRO submodel by considering that all culti-
vation area in each farm is allocated to rainfed rice. Although the farmer may grow other
crops and apply other irrigation strategies than the rainfed rice in the ECON submodel, this
assumption seems to have an insignificant eﬀect on runoﬀ.
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The DSSAT-derived runoﬀ from the rainfed rice field is only slightly diﬀerent from other non-
rainfed irrigation strategies. The mid-range and full irrigation strategies defined in the CROP
submodel divert only enough irrigation water to meet crop-water demands. Consequently very
little additional runoﬀ is generated when the crop is irrigated. Furthermore, the results from
our farm-level model show that the majority of cultivated land is allocated to rice.3
4.4 Utility Maximization Submodel - ECON
4.4.1 Objectives and Scope
The ECON submodel is an optimization program whose objective is to maximize the total
discounted utility of consumption by identifying the following optimal decisions: pond size (a
long-run decision), time spent working oﬀ-farm, crops planted, irrigation strategy used, and level
of household consumption in each season (real-time decisions). The optimal solution depends
on resource availability (land, labor, and water), crop prices, agricultural production costs,
oﬀ-farm wages, and interest rates. In addition, maximum storage limits for the on-farm pond
and larger storage facilities constrain the farmer’s optimal management choices. The objective
function of the ECON submodel maximizes the total discounted utility of consumption by
incorporating the farmer’s risk aversion measure and rate of time preference.
The government-level optimization model derives the following policy inputs to ECON: (1)
unit water price from the external storage facilities, (2) the number of farms sharing the external
storage facilities, (3) the amount of pond subsidy for each farm, and (4) the amount of direct
cash subsidies paid to each farmer. In response to these exogenous policy inputs, the ECON
submodel simulates the farmer’s optimal decisions while considering meteorological uncertainty.
The ECON submodel maximizes the farmer’s welfare across 10 sequences of 8-year horizon
and retrieves two groups of uncertain inputs through the state of nature index. The first group
consists of the 35 one-year records of meteorological data series, including weekly precipitation
and weekly pan evaporation. The ECON submodel is responsible for keeping track of water
stored in the communal and private water storage facilities. Figure 4-6 shows the conceptual
diagram of water fluxes into and out of each water storage facility: the inflows include precip-
3Chapter 5 provides extensive discussions on the results of the farm-level model.
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Figure 4-5: Structure of ECON submodel
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itation and runoﬀ from the watershed while the outflows include pan-evaporation, percolation
leakage, and spill in excess of the facility’s maximum capacity.
Figure 4-6: Primary water fluxes entering and leaving the water storage facilities (i.e., pond,
the reservoir, the enhanced in-stream storage) considered in the ECON submodel.
The second group of uncertain inputs consists of (1) seasonal crop yield and (2) weekly crop-
water requirement for each farm management option, both derived from the CROP submodel,
and (3) weekly water inflows to each storage facility derived from the HYDRO submodel. These
three data sets are simulated for each of the 35 states of nature.
4.4.2 Stochastic Approximations
We treat the ECON optimization problem as a finite-horizon discrete-time stochastic program-
ming problem. The ECON submodel optimizes the farmer’s management decisions over an
ensemble of 10 random meteorological sequences, using a sequential optimization approach.
That is, the ECON submodel maximizes utility in successive seasonal periods of an 8-year (or
24-season) horizon. The current period’s precipitation and pan evaporation are treated as
random variables whose values are not known to the farmer until after the current period’s
decision is made.
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Suppose that subproblem t is to maximize the mathematical expectation of the farmer’s
discounted utility from period t to the end of the planning horizon T . The ideal approach
for solving this problem is stochastic dynamic programming, a technique pioneered by Richard
Bellman (1961). The stochastic dynamic programming algorithm solves a series of subproblems
from the end of the horizon (t = T ) to the first period (t = 1), providing an optimal path for
each possible initial state. Analytical solutions to the stochastic dynamic programming are
generally not available for practical problems; numerical solutions are possible but can be
computationally burdensome [24].
In order to be computationally feasible, the ECON submodel needs to adopt a suboptimal
optimization approach that can be practically implemented while performing close to optimality.
We present a general formulation of our sequential optimization problem in order to illustrate
the implementation of two candidates for the suboptimal control. ECON’s outputs contain
two types of farmer’s management decisions: (1) the long-run decision which is made at the
beginning of the first season and maximized over all ten sequences of a 24-season horizon and (2)
the real-time decisions which are made each growing season, depending on actual meteorology.
Thus the ECON submodel uses nested sets of equations to solve for each solutions.
General Formulation
Our sequential stochastic optimization problem can be expressed concisely using vector nota-
tion:
• Objective function (gt(ut(xt))): total discounted utility of consumption
• Time index (t) : a 4-month planting season
• State vector (xt) : elements of state vector in season t (t = 1, 2, ..., 24).
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xt =


xt1 = storage volume of the reservoir (m
3)
xt2 = storage volume of the in-stream storage (m
3)
xt3 = storage volume of the 5% pond (m
3)
xt4 = storage volume of the 10% pond (m
3)
xt5 = storage volume of the 15% pond (m
3)
xt6 = wealth level (baht)


• Long-term decision variable (φ) : pond size (φ = 0, 5, 10, or 15 % of the farmer’s
land-holding area).
• Real-time decision variables (ut) : elements of decision vector in season t (t =
1, 2, ..., 24).
ut =


ut1 = 1 if the farmer works oﬀ-farm, 0 otherwise
ut2 = land allocated for rainfed rice (m2)
ut3 = land allocated for mid-range irrigated rice (m2)
ut4 = land allocated for full-irrigated rice (m2)
ut5 = land allocated for rainfed maize (m2)
ut6 = land allocated for mid-range irrigated maize (m2)
ut7 = land allocated for full-irrigated maize (m2)
ut8 = land allocated for rainfed soybeans (m2)
ut9 = land allocated for mid-range irrigated soybeans (m2)
ut10 = land allocated for full-irrigated soybeans (m2)
ut11 = quantity of water purchased from the reservoir (m3)
ut12 = quantity of water purchased from the in-stream storage (m3)
ut13 = household expenses for goods and services (baht)


• Random inputs (ωt) : elements of random input vector in season t (t = 1, 2, ..., 24).
ωt =

 ωt1 = precipitation (mm)
ωt2 = pan evaporation (mm)


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• Time horizon (T ) : 8 years or 24 planting seasons
Outer (long-term) Problem
φ = arg maxEω1,...,ωT
(
TX
t=1
gt(ut(xt)) + λt [xt+1 − f (xt, ut(xt),ωt,φ)]
)
(4.3)
subject to constraints.
For the long-run decision, we determine the pond size (φ) which maximizes the total discounted
utility throughout the time horizon T . The Lagrangian multiplier (λt) is used to append
the state equation (equality constraint): xt+1 = f (xt, ut(xt),ωt,φ) where t = 1, ..., 24 to the
objective function. The random input at time t (ωt), decision rule (ut(xt)) and the non-random
initial state (x1) contribute to the next state (xt+1).
In order to modify Equation 4.3 for GAMS Implementation, we approximate the probability
distribution functions used in the expectation over ωt by:
p(ω1, ...,ωT ) ' 1
10
(
10X
s=1
δ(ω1 − ωs1) · δ(ω2 − ωs2) · · · · · δ(ωT − ωsT )
)
(4.4)
where ωs1, ...,ω
s
T are inputs associated with sequence s. δ (x) in Equation 4.4 represents a
Kronecker delta function which is equal to one when x = 0 and equal to zero otherwise. Then
the long-term problem becomes as follows:
φ = arg max
1
ξ
ξX
s=1
(
TX
t=1
gt(ut(x
s
t )) + λt
£
xst+1 − f (xst , ut(xst ),ωst ,φ)
¤)
(4.5)
subject to constraints.
We obtain the decision rule (ut(xst )) by solving the secondary real-time problem defined in
Equation 4.6.
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Decision Rule (real-time) Problem
ut(xt,φ) = arg maxEωt,...,ωT
(
TX
i=t
gi(ui(xi)) + λi [xi+1 − f (xi, ui(xi),ωi,φ)]
)
(4.6)
subject to constraints.
Equation 4.6 gives the stage t decision ut for given xt and φ. Equations 4.5 and 4.6 could be
solved either iteratively or simultaneously, depending on the algorithm selected. The function
ut(xt,φ) could be found with a backward stochastic dynamic programming recursion. However,
it is not computationally feasible to solve this problem without further approximation.
We use two deterministic dynamic methods to give upper and lower bounds for the sto-
chastic dynamic programming solution: (1) a perfect information approach and (2) a certainty
equivalence approach. Each method represents one extreme of information available to the
farmer. Figure 4-7 illustrates the ranking of three approaches by degree of information.
Figure 4-7: Alternative approaches to deal with uncertainty, ranked by the amount of informa-
tion available to the decision maker.
• Perfect Information Approximation
In the perfect-information model, the farmer knows perfectly what will happen and thus can
optimize his action without making any mistakes. Accordingly, we approximate the decision
rule for the short-run problem (Equation 4.6) by
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ut(x
s
t ) = arg max
(
TX
i=t
gi(ui(x
s
i )) + λi
£
xsi+1 − f (xsi , ui(xsi ),ωsi ,φ)
¤)
, t = 1, ..., T(4.7)
subject to other constraints.
where xst and ω
s
t ,ω
s
t+1, ...,ω
s
T are known at each t. This perfect information assumption estab-
lishes the upper bound of the benefit a farmer can gain from knowing the future hydrology.
• Certainty Equivalence Approximation
In the case of certainty equivalence, the farmer acts as if future precipitation and evaporation
remain fixed at their long-term average levels. He therefore chooses his actions based on
the current state and the certain average-conditioned future. In particular, ωst ,ω
s
t+1, ...,ω
s
T
are replaced by ω¯st , ω¯
s
t+1, ..., ω¯
s
T where t is the current time which progressively varies from
t = 1, ..., T . We assume that the mean input ω¯t is the same for every sequence s (i.e., it is
a climatological mean dependent only on the season, not on the year.) The real-time decision
rule (Equation 4.6) is approximated as
ut(x
s
t ) = arg max
(
TX
i=t
gi(ui(x
s
i )) + λi [x¯i+1 − f (xsi , ui(xsi ), ω¯i,φ)]
)
, t = 1, ..., T (4.8)
subject to other constraints.
Actual values of ω1,ω2, ...,ωt are used to propagate the state equation for times up to the
current time t.
One obvious advantage of this certain equivalence approach is that we do not need to include
the distribution of disturbances (hence, meteorological variability) in the real-time optimization
problem. The implementation of the certainty equivalence approach is explained in details in
Appendix A.
4.4.3 Structure and Computation
The mathematical formulation of the sequential programming problem presented above is fa-
cilitated by a modelling software, called GAMS. The General Algebraic Modeling System
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(GAMS) is specifically designed for modeling linear, nonlinear and mixed integer optimization
problems. The software is especially useful for handling large, complex programming such
as our mixed-integer nonlinear problem by using an appropriate solver. GAMS software and
solvers are available commercially.
The structure of the ECON submodel below follows GAMS programming syntax.
Subscriptions:
n state of nature, n = 1, 2, ..., 35 indexes each year of the 35-year recorded
weather series
s index of a particular random 8-year state of nature sequence, s = 1, 2, ..., 10
r season (run#) in time horizon, r = 1, 2, .., 24 (3 seasons for 8 years)
i size of pond, i = 1, 2, 3 {05%,10%,15%}
j external storage facility type, j = 1, 2 {reservoir =1, in-stream storage= 2}
c crop type, c = 1, 2, 3 {rice, maize, soybeans}
p planting date, p = 1, 2, 3 {DEC, APR, AUG}
k irrigation strategy, k = 1, 2, 3 {rainfed, mid-irrigation, full-irrigation}
w week index, w = 1, ..., 52
We group inputs below by site-specific characteristics (financial, land, and labor inputs) and
inputs from the government-level model, and the HYDRO and CROP submodels of the farm-
level model. Appendix B lists values and sources of all inputs used in the ECON submodels.
INPUTS DEFINITION UNITS
Financial Inputs
rac constant relative risk aversion coeﬃcient
disctr discount factor
int bank’s interest rate for saving
labwage revenue from oﬀ-farm employment for a 4-month period baht/season
pricec price of crop c baht/kg
pumpfee pumping cost of water pumped baht/m3
fcsj amortized fixed cost for the external storage facility j baht/season
fcpi amortized fixed cost for a pond of size i baht/season
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vcc variable production cost of crop c (including non-irrigation
labor cost)
baht/m2-season
Land Inputs
land total land available on farm m2
lhouse housing area m2
landpi land used by a pond of size i m2
Labor Inputs
labpump labor required per unit water applied hour/m3
labsupr labor available in season r hour/season
Inputs from Government-level Model
nfarm the number of participating farms
storj binary variable indicating whether or not a specified exter-
nal storage facility j is constructed
πj water price per unit diverted from external storage facility
j
baht/m3
capj capacity of the external storage facility j m3
cappi capacity of a pond of size i m3
Inputs from CROP Submodel
watdemcpkwn water demanded for crop c, plant date p, irrigation strategy
k, for week w under the nth state of nature
m/week
yldcpkn yield of crop c, plant date p, irrigation strategy k under the
nth state of nature
kg/m2-season
Inputs from HYDRO Submodel
αiwn water inflow to pond of size i under the nth state of nature
at week w
m3/week
λjpn water inflow to external storage facility j allocated for each
farm under the nth state of nature during period p
m3/season
evwn weekly evaporation under the nth state of nature at week
w
m/week
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Note: Repayment schemes (i.e. low-interest loans) may be included in fcpi and fcsj .
We assume that per unit pumping cost (pumpfee) from pond is equal to pumpfee from the
enhanced in-stream storage and the reservoir.
We begin the list of GAMS programming’s decision variables with the farmer’s utility and
decisions (long-run and real-time), then wealth, expenses and revenues, and end with water
fluxes.
DECISION VAR. DEFINITION UNITS
Farmer’s Decisions
AVEUTIL average discounted utility of consumption util
PONDi integer variable = 1 if a pond of size i is constructed, 0
otherwise
EMPLOYsr integer variable = 1 if the farmer works oﬀ-farm in season
r in sequence s, 0 otherwise
WATOUTjwsr water drawn from external storage facility j to an individ-
ual farm in week w of season r in sequence s
m2
PRODAREAcksr area of crop c planted with irrigation strategy k in season
r in sequence s
m2
CONSUMEsr seasonal amount consumed for goods & services in season
r in sequence s
baht
Wealth, Expenses, and Revenues
WEALTHsr wealth level at the beginning of season r in sequence s baht
INCsr net income from on-farm agriculture and oﬀ-farm employ-
ment in season r in sequence s
baht
REVsr revenue from on-farm agriculture in season r in sequence
s
baht
PRODCOSTsr average production cost excluding irrigation in season r in
sequence s
baht
PUMPCOSTsr irrigation pumping cost in season r in sequence s baht
LABDEMsr labor demanded for irrigation for season r in sequence s hour
Water Fluxes
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WATSUPwsr water stored in pond in week w of season r in sequence s m2
SPILLPONDwsr water spill from pond in week w of season r in sequence s m2
WATSTORjsr water stored in storage facility j in season r in sequence s m2
SPILLSTORjsr water spill from external storage facility j in season r in
sequence s
m2
The GAMS optimization program is configured somewhat diﬀerently for the perfect infor-
mation and the certainty equivalence approaches.
Perfect Information Method : The problem is solved once over r = 1, ..R (R = 24 seasons),
using the actual values for all random inputs (αiwn,λjpn, evwn, watdemcpkwn, yldcpkn) .
Certainty Equivalence Method : GAMS solves R + 1 optimization problems for each of
the random sequences (s = 1, ..., 10), used to derive the expected utility. Problem r˜ treats real-
time decisions made for r = 1, ..., r˜−1 as inputs and makes new decisions for r = r˜, ..., R where
r˜ is the current time. The random inputs (αiwn,λjpn, evwn, watdemcpkwn, yldcpkn) take on the
actual historical values for r = 1, ..., r˜ and the long-term average values for r = r˜ + 1, ..., R.
Objective function
max
D
1
S
SX
s=1
RX
r=1
disctrU(CONSUMEsr) (4.9)
The objective function in Equation 4.9 is the expected present value of seasonal utility of
consumption. Wealth does not contribute to the level of utility. The eﬀect of time preference
is incorporated in discounted factor (disct), while the eﬀect of risk aversion is embedded in the
following utility function.
The utility function used is the constant relative risk aversion function (CRRA) derived for
Thailand’s semi-rural farming households by Paulson and Townsend (2001)4.
4Paulson and Townsend (2001) derived CRRA values for 4 provinces in Thailand: Lopburi, Chacherngsao,
Buriram, and Sisaket. We use the estimate for farming households in Lopburi Province due to its comparable
socio-economic and geographic profiles to our study site in Saraburi Province.
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U(consumption) =
1
1− racconsumption
(1−rac)
Constraints
Wealth : Equation 4.10 computes the farmer’s wealth level in the next period given the
interest rate. There is no flexibility to borrow as we assume that a credit market is absent.
Note that interest is applied to wealth remaining after consumption. We specify that the wealth
in the terminal period must be greater than or equal to its initial level to prevent depletion of
all wealth at the end of the study period.
WEALTHs,r+1 = (1 + int)(WEALTHsr −CONSUMEsr) + INCsr ∀s, r (4.10)
Pond Size : Equation 4.11 constrains the pond integer variable so that only one size is
considered.
IX
i=1
PONDi ≤ 1 (4.11)
Land Limitation : Equation 4.12 limits land for crops plus the pond to the available land.
The parcel of land allocated to the pond is assumed to be as productive as the planted land
given a relatively small land—holding area and uniform soil profile.
IX
i=1
landpiPONDi +
CX
c=1
KX
k=1
PRODAREAcksr ≤ land− lhouse ∀s, r (4.12)
Labor Limitation : Equation 4.14 limits total labor usage; the farmer chooses to either work
oﬀ-farm or cultivate on-farm for the entire planting season (s, r). To reduce the dimension of
the problem, the endogenously determined labor demand for irrigation, resulted from Equation
4.13, is defined on a seasonal basis (r). We only constrain labor on irrigation demand. Other
labor requirements for soil preparation and harvest necessitate hiring outside labor and depend
only on cultivation area of each crop type. Thus the variable production cost of crop c excluding
irrigation cost (vcc) already includes the cost of such labor requirements.
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labpump
CX
c=1
KX
k=1
X
w(r)
watdemcpkw,n(s,r)PRODAREAcksr − LABDEMsr = 0 ∀s, r (4.13)
LABDEMsr + labsuprEMPLOYsr ≤ labsupr ∀s, r (4.14)
Pond Water Balance : Equation 4.15 is a weekly water balance for the pond; water di-
verted from the storage facilities (WATOUTjwsr) is included. SPILLPONDwsr represents
the amount of water which exceeds the capacity of the on-farm pond and is released outside the
farm’s boundary. This balance equation accounts for evaporation loss given that the pond’s
wall is perpendicular to the ground; that is, there is no slope. Water stored on-farm is limited
to the capacity of a constructed pond in Equation 4.16.
WATSUPw+1,sr = WATSUPwsr +
IX
i=1
αiw,n(s,r)PONDi +
JX
j=1
WATOUTjwsrstorj
−
CX
c=1
KX
k=1
watdemc,p(r),kw,n(s,r)PRODAREAcksr
−
IX
i=1
evw,n(s,r)landpi − SPILLPONDwsr ∀w, s, r (4.15)
WATSUPwsr −
IX
i=1
cappiPONDi ≤ 0 ∀w, s, r (4.16)
External Storage Water Balance : Equation 4.17 is a seasonal water balance in each
external storage facility j. Water diverted to individual farms is evenly distributed due to
their identical characteristics; hence, the total amount of outflows is multiplied by the number
of participating farms (nfarm). Each external storage facility has a specific geometry; the
relationship between storage volume and water surface is represented by a non-linear function
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SURFj(volume).5 The model calculates evaporation loss by multiplying this surface function
with weekly evaporation rate (evwn).
WATSTORjs,r+1 = WATSTORjsr + λjp,n(s,r)storj
−
X
w(r)
evw,n(s,r)SURF (WATSTORjsr)
−nfarm
X
w∈r
WATOUTjwsr − SPILLSTORjsr ∀j, s, r (4.17)
WATSTORjsr ≤ capj ∀j, s, r (4.18)
Total Agricultural Revenue : Equation 4.19 determines total agricultural revenue accruing
in the current period.
REVsr −
CX
c=1
KX
k=1
pricecyldc,p(r),k,n(s,r)PRODAREAcksr ≤ 0 ∀s, r (4.19)
Total Production Cost : Equation 4.20 calculates the total production cost excluding the
costs associated with irrigation activities. This cost includes expenses from seed purchase,
soil preparation, and fertilizer application. It is assumed that variable production costs less
irrigation costs are the same for irrigated and rainfed production.
CX
c=1
KX
k=1
vccPRODAREAcksr − PRODCOSTsr ≤ 0 ∀s, r (4.20)
Irrigation Cost : Equation 4.21 forces PUMPCOSTsr to reflect the actual cost of supple-
mental irrigation water, containing total pumping cost and purchase of water drawn from large
5Our model uses the following functions to derive surface area of the external storage facilities (unit volume
in ha-mm & unit surface in ha) :
SURFreservoir(vol) = (1.8071× 10−11)vol3 + (−2.6741× 10−5)vol2 + 12.9028vol+5.9486× 105
SURFin−stream(vol) = 6.5934vol.
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storage facilities.
pumpfee
CX
c=1
KX
k=1
X
w(r)
watdemckw,n(s,r)PRODAREAcksr
+
JX
j=1
X
w(r)
πjWATOUTjwsrstorj − PUMPCOSTsr = 0 ∀s, r (4.21)
Net Annual Income : Net annual income is calculated by Equation 4.22.
INCsr −REVsr − labwageEMPLOYsr + PRODCOSTsr
+ PUMPCOSTsr +
IX
i=1
fcpiPONDi +
1
nfarm
JX
j=1
fcsjstorj ≤ 0 ∀s, r (4.22)
INCsr ∈ R
PONDi, EMPLOYsr ∈ {0, 1}
all other variables ≥ 0
4.4.4 Model Assumptions
The ECON submodel assumes homogeneity among all 30 farmers. Their characteristics, in-
cluding risk aversion coeﬃcient, rate of time preference, asset (land & housing area.) and initial
wealth, are identical. This assumption is reasonable due to our small study area.
No borrowing is allowed in the absence of a well-functioning credit market. Evidence
indicates that the local farmers do not borrow money to self-finance a profitable investment
(for example, a public community-scale storage facility) due to lack of suﬃcient collateral assets.
If the credit market functions properly, these farmers should be able to apply for a loan given
the anticipated profits. Consequently, our model does not allow borrowing and wealth level is
always non-negative.
The terminal value of wealth (WEALTHs,r+1) must be greater than or equal to the initial
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level (WEALTHs1). This terminal condition is specified to avoid wealth depletion. Otherwise,
the farmer would deplete all his savings at the end of the planning horizon because the wealth
level beyond this horizon does not contribute to utility. Another way to tackle this problem is
to estimate the terminal utility as a function of his heir’s bequest. Nevertheless, this estimation
needs additional information and is beyond the scope of our study.
Agricultural labor is limited to irrigation only. Provided that all of the farmers are identical,
there is no labor market during the growing season. Therefore, irrigation works require only
household labor. However, the farmer hires outside labor during preparation and harvesting
periods. The cost of hiring labor outside of the model’s system is included in the production
cost for each crop.
The only source of uncertainty applied in our model comes from meteorology. Although
the farmer is also subject to fluctuations in product prices, wages and interest rate over time,
reality shows that his income fluctuation appears to be aﬀected most by weather uncertainty
than by other sources of uncertainty [74]. For simplification purposes, the crop prices, bank’s
interest rate and oﬀ-farm wages remain constant across seasons and time horizon.
The existence of the external storage facilities (i.e., the communal reservoir and the en-
hanced in-stream storage) are specified by the government and, therefore, are exogenous to the
individual farmer’s decision-making process. However, the farmer can decide not to purchase
water from the given external facilities if the cost of purchase exceeds his expected gain. The
farmers’ purchases consequently influences the external facilities’ storage volumes.
The ponds’ water storage volumes are updated weekly (Equation 4.15) while the external
facilities’ storage volumes are updated seasonally (Equation 4.17). The storage of external
facilities, having much longer memory than the ponds, fluctuate negligibly over weekly time
scales. This seasonal time step of the external water storage helps reduce the number of
equations GAMS has to solve.
Water spilled from both the pond and the external storage facilities (SPILLPONDwsr and
SPILLSTORjsr) is considered as loss. The water diverted from the external storage is dic-
tated only by the aggregate demand of the beneficiary farmers. The excess water beyond the
maximum capacities of the external facilities goes out of the system.
There is no distance-dependent cost factor on irrigation purchase. In reality, the farmers
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riparian to the external storage facilities pay a lower pumping cost per unit volume than their
non-riparian neighbors. Since our model assumes identical farm characteristics, we do not
diﬀerentiate farmers by locations.
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Chapter 5
Farmer’s Responses to Government
Policy
This Chapter demonstrates the results of the hydrologic-economic model, which predicts the
individual farmer’s response to irrigation policy. We examine the farmer’s decisions regard-
ing pond size, water demand, oﬀ-farm employment, crop selection, irrigation strategy, and
consumption behavior for diﬀerent reservoir water prices. Furthermore, we investigate the sen-
sitivity of the farmer’s decisions with respect to changes in attitude towards risk, labor wage,
and the number of participating farms.
The farmer’s decisions are subject to assumptions about the farmer’s knowledge of future
precipitation and evapotranspiration. We present the results and the sensitivity analysis from
both the perfect information and the certainty equivalence approximations together so that it
is easy to make a comparison. The results from the perfect information approximation are
smoother as the farmer knows exactly what will happen in the future and thus can make the
best possible decisions at the present period. The certainty equivalent farmer often makes
mistakes and appears more conservative because he assumes an average condition. The actual
response should lie somewhere in between. The model’s results show that there are only minor
diﬀerences between the results of the two assumptions.
Next we discuss model validation and the economic ineﬃciency of the nominal policy. Al-
though the size of our sample is too limited to make a meaningful quantitative inferences,
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the model’s output yields an accurate picture of how a generic farmer makes decisions. In
general, the farmer tends to choose too big a pond because he does not bear its construction
cost. Therefore, cultivation land and government subsidy may be utilized ineﬃciently under
the nominal policy.
5.1 The Nominal Policy on Irrigation Infrastructure
The current policy at the study site provides irrigation water from the Huai Hin Khao reservoir
to 30 farms through a network of gravity-driven pipelines. All of the 30 beneficiary farms
receive this supplemental water free of charge. In addition each farmer can obtain an on-farm
pond and has full control over the pond’s size. If the farmer wishes to build the pond on
his land, the government fully pays for its construction cost. The results discussed here are
based on this nominal policy and on departures from this policy which enable the government
to charge for water from the reservoir.
The information on the connection between the farmer’s utility and the cost of a particular
policy are crucial to the social planner in determining the optimal policy. The net cost of a
government policy is the cost of constructing the pond and the public storage facilities plus
any cash subsidy provided to the farmer less the revenue generated from the sales of irrigation
water.
Summary of the parameters used as the base case for the nominal policy can be found in
Appendix B.
5.2 Sensitivity Results
This section discusses in detail the farmer’s decisions regarding pond size, water demand, oﬀ-
farm employment, crop selection & irrigation strategy, and consumption behavior. These
results depend on the nominal government policy, which takes the form of fully subsidized
on-farm pond and partially subsidized supplemental irrigation from the communal reservoir.
The discussion below focuses on the sensitivity to the certainty equivalence and the perfect
information approximations and to government-specified water prices.
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5.2.1 Farmer’s Response to Reservoir’s Water Price
Pond Size
Pond construction is the only long-run decision the farmer faces in this policy setting. He
decides on the size of the on-farm pond he wants to install in response to the price of water
from the reservoir. Decisions on the extent of the external storage facility’s construction and
on the number of participating farms are up to the government; the participating farmers only
see the water price and the external storage supply available to them. When the water price
is very low, the farmer does not want to sacrifice a large patch of cultivation land for a pond.
Rather, he chooses to rely mainly on water supply from the external source. When the water
price is higher, the farmer is better oﬀ installing a pond in his farm to secure free water supply.
Figure 5-1 demonstrates the dependence of the pond decision on the price of water from the
communal reservoir. Suppose that the communal reservoir serves a group of 30 farms. The
farmers then opt to purchase water from the reservoir without installing a pond so long as the
water price is below 1.0 bath/cu.m. They build a bigger pond as the water price increases
until the price reaches 3.0 baht/cu.m. Then they rely entirely on water harvested in the pond
and no longer purchase water from the reservoir.
The diﬀerence in the pond decisions between the perfect information case and the certainty
equivalence case is minor. Given the water price of 2.0 baht/cu.m., the farmer decides to
construct a 5% pond under the perfect information assumption while he opts a 10% pond
under the certainty equivalence assumption.
The certainty-equivalence farmer, expecting an average weather condition with certainty,
tends to select crop types in accordance with the mean water supply. In extreme weather
conditions, the farmer needs to either let the crop fail or to purchase more water than planned.
His risk averse nature induces him to build his own pond. The on-farm pond provides securing
free water and costs a fixed maintenance cost. Without a pond, he is subject to unsteady
cost of external water purchase due to the meteorological uncertainty. The perfect information
farmer experiences meteorological variability but not uncertainty. He knows in advance when
meteorological conditions will be favorable or unfavorable and he responds accordingly.
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Figure 5-1: The farmer’s long-run decision on pond construction obtained from perfect infor-
mation and certainty equivalence approximations. The size of an on-farm pond is plotted as a
function of price for the reservoir water.
Water Demand
Figure 5-2 derived from our farm-level model plots the irrigation water demand curve. Water
demand also depends on the existence and size of an on-farm pond. A farm without a pond
meets all of its irrigation needs from the communal reservoir while a farm with a large pond
barely purchases external water. As a farmer builds a larger pond in response to the higher
water price (shown in Figure 5-1), the demand for external water declines accordingly. Figure
5-2 exhibits an abrupt drop of the farmer’s water purchase quantity when the infrastructure
decision is changed. For instance, the certainty-equivalence farmer builds a 10% pond when
the water price from the communal storage exceeds 2.0 baht/cu.m. The corresponding demand
for reservoir water dramatically plummets. A farm with a pond buys external water only in
the April-July season due to the season’s extremely erratic weather.
The two approximation methods yield somewhat diﬀerent results on water demand. Figure
5-2 shows a downward piecewise partial-step curve for the certainty equivalence demand. That
means the quantity of water purchase plotted against price under the certainty equivalence
approximation stays flat given the same storage infrastructure (i.e., a pond of a specific size
and the reservoir). The perfect information demand appears smoother in comparison. The
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Figure 5-2: Seasonal comparison of quantity of water purchased versus water price from the
reservoir between perfect information and certainty equivalence approximations. The results
are shown as average values in each of the 4-month seasons.
perfect information farmer knows exact future hydrology and can plant a crop such that it uses
all available rainwater to the fullest extent with minimal need to buy irrigation from external
sources. The certainty equivalence farmer, on the contrary, assumes the average meteorological
condition and therefore grows more irrigated crop than he optimally should. Thus he has to
buy external water because the pond does not provide suﬃcient irrigation water.
From Figure 5-2, the diﬀerence between water demands from both approximations is most
apparent in the highly unpredictable season: April-July. The perfect information demand falls
to roughly two third of the certainty equivalence demand in the absence of an on-farm pond
(the middle plot in Figure 5-2 when the water price is below 2.0 baht/cu.m.) This diﬀerence
reflects the risk premium the farmer is willing to pay.
Figure 5-3 shows an uncommonly high variance in perfect information demands in April -
July. There is only minimal variance within other seasons—December to March and August to
November. Because the perfect information farmer is more adaptive to weather variation, the
farmer does not have a pond. There is significant variability in water purchases.
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Figure 5-3: Standard deviation of water purchased from the communal reservoir in each of the
three seasons over the 8-year horizon with respect to the water price.
Farm Management
Each season the farmer must make three distinct real-time decisions: (1) decision to work on or
oﬀ farm, (2) decision on crops to be planted, and (3) decision on irrigation strategies to be used
(i.e., on how much supplemental water to buy.) This section examines each of these decisions
for the nominal government policy.
The farmer decides at the beginning of each growing season whether to seek oﬀ-farm em-
ployment or to undertake on-farm agriculture. If a free pond is provided by the government,
the farmer always chooses farming regardless of water price.
However, his farm management decisions regarding crop types and irrigation strategies
depend significantly on water price. Figure 5-4 illustrates that a larger percentage of fully-
irrigated crops is planted at high water price than at low water price. This result can be
explained by the existence of an on-farm pond to supply irrigation water when the water price
is high. Table 5.1 summarizes the irrigation strategy and crop selection depicted in Figure 5-4.
From Figure 5-4, the single largest portion of the cultivated land is allocated to fully-irrigated
rice. Rainfed rice and rainfed soybeans are the second and the third largest crop selections,
respectively. This result reflects the eﬀect of constraints, either on water supply or on labor
inputs, which prevent the farmer from growing only fully-irrigated rice.
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Figure 5-4: Farm management decisions in comparison between the perfect information and the
certainty equivalence approximations and between the high and the low water price levels. The
high water price shown here <top plots> is from the communal reservoir at 10.0 baht/cu.m.
while the low water price <bottom plots> is at 1.0 baht/cu.m.
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Water Price Approximation Irrig. Strategy (%) Crop Type (%)
Method Rainfed Mid-
ranged
Full Rice Maize Soybeans
High Perfect Info. 10 1 89 94 2 4
[10.0 baht/cu.m.] Certainty Eq. 12 - 87 88 - 11
Low Perfect Info. 35 9 57 80 8 12
[1.0 baht/cu.m.] Certainty Eq. 16 - 84 87 - 13
Table 5.1: Percentage of cultivation land devoted to diﬀerent irrigation stragtegies and crop
types for high and low prices of water from the communal reservoir.
Table 5.2 summarizes the seasonal averages of farm management decisions at a water price of
1.0 baht/cu.m. Since August - November is the wettest season of all three, irrigated plants need
little supplemental water. Although the highest percentage of land is devoted to fully-irrigated
rice in this season, the demand for irrigation is the lowest. During December - March, the farmer
grows mainly irrigated rice (62-79% from Figure 5-5) while the rest of the land is devoted to
rainfed cultivation. This explains the substantial water demand in the December - March season
in Figure 5-2 since the farmer opts to meet all his irrigation need through the reservoir at water
price of 1.0 baht/cu.m. The precipitation from April to July is most unpredictable. Although
rice constitutes the largest production for that period, the irrigation strategy designated to
rice cultivation seems unclear. The two approximation methods predict inconsistent farm
management decisions—the certainty equivalence approximation predicts that the farmer will
grow principally rainfed rice while the perfect information approximation suggests that the
farmer will diversify crop selection as well as irrigation strategy. This is reflected in diﬀerent
irrigation demand functions in Figure 5-2.
Season Approximation Irrigation Strategy (%) Crop Type (%)
Method Rainfed Mid-
range
Full Rice Maize Soybeans
DEC Perfect Info. 21 - 79 79 7 14
Certainty Eq. 38 - 62 62 - 38
APR Perfect Info. 54 25 22 60 16 25
Certainty Eq. 9 - 91 100 - -
AUG Perfect Info. 25 - 75 100 - -
Certainty Eq. - - 100 100 - -
Table 5.2: Percentage of cultivation land devoted to each irrigation strategy and each crop type
in the diﬀerent growing seasons.
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Figure 5-5: A seasonal comparison of farm managment between the perfect information and
the certainty equivalence approximations. Note that the reservoir’s water price used for these
plots is 1.0 baht/cu.m.
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We pick the low water price scenario to show seasonal diﬀerences between the two approx-
imation methods in Figure 5-5 (Table 5.2). This is because the pond supplies most of the
irrigation requirement when water is expensive. Thus, the farmer’s crop and irrigation de-
cisions are less responsive to water price. The perfect information results represent the best
possible farm allocation. In erratic meteorological conditions as in APR and AUG seasons, the
certainty equivalence farmer tends to be conservative and over-irrigate crops. In the minimal
variation period (DEC), however, the certainty equivalence farmer irrigates less than under the
perfect information assumption. The certainty equivalence farmer grows some rainfed soybeans
which require less water but produce higher revenue than rainfed rice.
With a free pond and the communal reservoir, the farmer never goes oﬀ-farm. Under the
certainty equivalence assumption, the farmer almost always picks the same farming strategy.
We see an obvious annual cycle of three seasons because the farmer sees future condition as a
long-run average (Figure 5-6). On the other hand, the perfect information farmer can adjust
his farm management decision in accordance with the meteorological fluctuations.
Wealth and Consumption
Figure 5-7 plots the farmer’s seasonal net agriculture revenue accrued from agriculture decreas-
ing with water price. As the water price increases, the farmer switches to a less expensive
source by installing an on-farm pond. The slope of the average household income curve in
Figure 5-7 gradually becomes nearly flat once a pond is built. The farmer rarely purchases
water from the reservoir.
In fact, the perfect information farmer does not divert any external water after building a
10% pond. As a result, his income is no longer aﬀected by price. The certainty equivalence
farmer, on the other hand, still buys small amount of irrigation water even with a 10% pond.
His income declines slightly as the reservoir’s water price rises.
The income diﬀerence between the two approximations is more obvious when the price
of water is low. Figure 5-8 compares seasonal income between the two approximations and
illustrates that incomes obtained from the perfect information approach perform equally well
or better than the matching incomes from the certainty equivalence approach. The income
gap appears clearest during the high-variance season (April-July, represented by red dots.)
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Figure 5-6: Area allocation (in hectare) to each farm management option. This plot illustrates
variation across the time series.
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Figure 5-7: The farmer’s average net seasonal income plotted as a function of water price from
the communal reservoir.
Figure 5-9 shows the histogram of the income diﬀerences. The perfect information assump-
tion yields higher incomes than the certainty equivalence assumption only by a close margin.
More than 60% of the times, both methods give similar income predictions. Perfect informa-
tion about future precipitation and evaporation does not lead to a substantial gain in revenue
at the study site.
Figure 5-10 plots the results on the farmer’s consumption and saving behavior from two
approximations. Similar to income, results on consumption and savings from the two approxi-
mation methods follow the same trends. Nevertheless, the farmer spends slightly less and saves
slightly more under the certainty equivalence assumption (Table 5.3.) This is not the result of
his risk averse attitude, which is identical across diﬀerent approximation methods, but rather,
is due to his lack of knowledge of the future hydrology. The farmer sets aside his consumption
expenses at the beginning of each period in accordance with the expected net revenue in that
period. Knowing future weather, the perfect information farmer can consume as much as he
likes while maintaining a level of precautionary savings to ensure steady consumption. On the
other hand, the certainty equivalence farmer is subject to slightly higher income fluctuations
which results in unsteady consumption and savings.
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Figure 5-8: Comparison of farmer’s revenue generated from the two approximation methods.
Each dot represents income from a diﬀerent period given water price of 1.0 baht/cu.m.) from
the reservoir.
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Figure 5-9: Histogram of income diﬀerence between perfect information and certainty equiva-
lence approximations. The plot uses seasonal incomes across all the water price levels.
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Figure 5-10: Consumption and savings with water price of 1.0 baht/cu.m. from the reservoir.
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Activities Approximation Mean Standard Deviation
Method [thousand baht]
saving perfect information 17.047 13.520
certainty equivalence 22.372 14.849
consumption perfect information 58.673 2.927
certainty equivalence 57.716 3.833
Table 5.3: Mean and the standard deviation of the farmer’s consumption and saving, calculated
under water price of 1.0 baht/cu.m. from the reservoir.
Utility
The farmer’s objective function is the discounted utility of consumption, which the farmer tries
to maximize under the given constraints. Utility plots with respect to water price in Figure
5-11 look somewhat similar to the income plots in Figure 5-7. The utility of consumption
drops with increasing water price because a larger portion of the farmer’s income is spent on
irrigation.
Despite the common shape of the utility and income curves, the gap between the two ap-
proximation methods appears more emphatic in Figure 5-11. The perfect information farmer’s
consumption time-series in Figure 5-10 is higher and less fluctuating than that of the certainty
equivalence farmer. As a result, the certainty equivalence farmer’s utility is penalized by his
positive risk aversion measure and the fluctuation in consumption.
5.2.2 Farmer’s Sensitivity to Changes in Other Inputs
Sensitivity analysis enables the analyst to determine how changes in parameters aﬀect simula-
tion results. Three parameters are selected for our sensitivity analysis: (1) the risk aversion
measure, (2) the labor wage, and (3) the number of farms sharing the external storage facil-
ity. Other well-documented parameters such as crop prices and inputs related to cultivation
practice (e.g., soil preparation, seeding pattern, fertilizer application) are fixed as they do not
contribute much to the design of irrigation policies.
We discuss the eﬀect of each parameter on the pond size, the quantity of water purchased
from the reservoir, oﬀ-farm employment and the associated utility of consumption. These
variables also respond to changes in water price. We consider both the perfect information
and the certainty equivalence approximations to set upper and lower limits on the eﬀect of
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Figure 5-11: Farmer’s average utility across all weather sequences with respect to water price
from the communal reservoir.
parameter variations. The results show that the farmer’s decisions are less sensitive under the
certainty equivalence approximation. Overall, the diﬀerence in sensitivity results from the two
methods is minor.
The sensitivity results presented in this section are evaluated relative to a base case defined
by the inputs in Appendix B. This nominal policy fully subsidizes the pond construction
regardless of size and sells irrigation water from the communal reservoir.
Risk Aversion
Figure 5-12 shows the sensitivity of the farmer’s behavior (measured in terms of savings and
consumption) to changes in the risk aversion coeﬃcient appearing in the utility function. A
more risk-averse farmer suﬀers more from fluctuations in consumption. Thus he increases his
savings to provide a cushion that can be used to smooth consumption during periods of low
income. By contrast, a risk-neutral farmer uses up all available income and never saves. The
sensitivity analysis results indicate that steady-state wealth (precautionary saving) is positively
correlated to the constant relative risk aversion measure.
Figure 5-13 shows the impact of the risk aversion measure on pond size for diﬀerent water
prices. The pond weakly decreases the risk from weather variability and smooths consumption.
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Figure 5-12: Average saving and consumption for diﬀerent constant relative risk avesion mea-
sures at reservoir’s water price of 1.0 baht/cu.m.
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Therefore, we would expect increased risk aversion to result in the construction of a larger on-
farm pond. In particular, a 10% pond adequately secures water supply without the need for
further supplemental irrigation. However, our results show that a highly risk-averse farmer
(risk aversion = 0.9, the top plot in Figure 5-13) decides to build a smaller pond of 5% at
3.0-4.0 baht/cu.m. under the perfect information approximation. The farmer, instead of
attempting to secure water supply, switches to less irrigated and more rainfed cultivation. The
area allocated for rainfed maize expands while the irrigated rice area shrinks. Thus, only a 5%
pond is suﬃcient for such low irrigation demand.
When the certainty equivalence approximation is adopted, the pond size is insensitive to the
risk aversion measure (the bottom plot in Figure 5-13.) Even the farm management decisions on
crop selection and irrigation strategies remain unaﬀected across all levels of risk aversion. The
farmer’s long-run decision on pond size is made at the beginning of the period and depending on
long-term average of precipitation and evaporation under the certainty equivalence assumption.
Therefore, changes in risk aversion do not aﬀect the long-run decisions. Nevertheless, the actual
future hydrology is not certain, and the farmer’s income fluctuates as a result. This explains
the farmer’s diﬀerent consumption and saving levels for diﬀerent risk aversion measures under
the certainty equivalence approximation in Figure 5-12.
Figure 5-14 shows the eﬀect of the risk aversion measure on the amount of water purchased
from the reservoir. The perfect information plot (top) shows that, at a water price of 3.0
baht/cu.m., a risk-neutral farmer grows slightly more irrigated crops than a more risk-averse
counterpart. The positive amount in the 0.9 risk aversion case does not represent an increase
in irrigated crops but the additional amount of irrigation needed in addition to the 5% pond’s
supply. Irrigation demand under the certainty equivalence method remains constant for all
risk aversion levels.
Both approximation methods give the similar employment decisions in which the farmer
never seeks oﬀ-farm employment regardless of the risk aversion level and water price.
Labor Wage
Figure 5-15 shows the sensitivity of the farmer’s utility to the oﬀ-farm labor wage for various
water prices. The labor wage of 143 baht/day in our base case is the mandatory minimum
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Figure 5-13: Sensitivity analysis of pond size to risk aversion parameter and reservoir’s water
prices.
100
Figure 5-14: Sensitivity analysis of quantity of water purchased to risk aversion parameter and
reservoir’s water price.
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labor wage at the study site, issued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Therefore,
the sensitivity analysis increases the amount of labor wage in order to observe the eﬀects on
real-time agricultural management decisions for a high-skilled oﬀ-farm worker. The higher-
revenue alternative naturally increases the farmer’s consumption opportunities. Such eﬀect
only occurs, however, if the alternative is being chosen. If the farmer chooses to work oﬀ-farm
more often (because of the higher wage), he will have more income at his disposal. Conse-
quently, he is able to spend more while still keeping the precautionary saving level. Figure
5-15 illustrates the gradual rise of farmer’s utility in the perfect information approximation as
the wage increases. The abrupt hike at the wage level of 200% increase under the certainty
equivalence approximation is due to the farmer’s decision to work oﬀ-farm in the dry season
when the water price is in the range of 1.0-4.0 baht/cu.m. We will discuss this decision later
in this section.
Figure 5-16 shows the eﬀect of labor wage on pond size for various reservoir’s water prices.
An increased wage rate changes the farmer’s choice to irrigate. The farmer has higher tendency
to seek oﬀ-farm employment in dry seasons as this choice yields higher return. As a result, he
installs a smaller pond as the labor wage rises. The perfect information plot indicates that he
may not even want to build any on-farm pond for a suﬃciently high labor wage because of the
higher revenue obtained from oﬀ-farm labor as compared to agriculture.
Figure 5-17 shows how the quantity of water purchased depend on the labor wage. Given
the labor wage of 429 baht/day (+200% of the base-case wage) under the perfect information
approximation, the farmer accumulates higher oﬀ-farm revenue during dry seasons. Although
he reduces his irrigation demand, under these circumstances the farmer actually purchases more
water (when the water price is in the range of 3.0-8.0 baht/cu.m.) since he has not invested in
as much pond storage.
Figure 5-18 shows how the labor wage and water price influence the fraction of time the
farmer decides to work oﬀ-farm. This fraction tends to rise and then fall with water price
at wages of 357 bath/day in the perfect information case and 429 baht/day in the certainty
equivalence case. This behavior results from the discretization of pond size. In the perfect
information case, a farmer with no pond is likely to work oﬀ-farm more frequently as the
reservoir’s water price increases. The increasing trend is broken when the farmer adopts a 5%
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Figure 5-15: Sensitivity analysis of individual utility to oﬀ-farm labor wage and reservoir’s
water price. The base case is for daily wage of 143 baht.
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Figure 5-16: Sensitivity analysis of pond size to oﬀ-farm wage rate and the reservoir’s water
price.
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Figure 5-17: Sensitivity analysis of quantity of water purchased from the reservoir to oﬀ-farm
wage rate and water price.
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pond at water price of 3.0 baht/cu.m., and again when a 10% pond is built at water price of
4.0 baht/cu.m. For the certainty equivalence case, the farmer does not work in town when
the reservoir water is free of charge. When the water price increases to the range of 1.0-4.0
baht/cu.m., the fraction of time worked oﬀ-farm remains steady at about 0.34. Once the price
reaches 5.0 bath/cu.m., the farmer builds a 10% pond and no longer works oﬀ-farm regardless
of water price.
Number of Participating Farms
Our base-case scenario assumes that the communal reservoir serves 30 identical small-scale
farms. The model results indicate that the farmer can sustain his irrigation need entirely from
the reservoir at a water price below 2.0 baht/cu.m. He never needs to work oﬀ-farm; nor does
he install an on-farm pond. This implies the under-use of the available water resources. Our
sensitivity analysis expands the pool of farms which have access to the reservoir’s supply in
order to understand the relationship of farm participation and farmer’s optimal management
decisions.
Figure 5-19 shows the sensitivity of farmer’s utility to the number of farms served by the
communal reservoir. With a larger number of participating farms, water storage in the com-
munal reservoir becomes constrained at low prices. Even if the farmer does not go to work
oﬀ-farm, his income would fall due to lower productivity or, in the worst case, crop failure.
Figure 5-19 indicates that the perfect information and certainty equivalence approximations
give very similar results.
Figures 5-20 and 5-21 show how pond size and quantity of water purchased depend on the
number of farms and water price, respectively. When the number of farms increases and the
reservoir’s storage supply becomes constrained, the farmer is better oﬀ with his own larger
on-farm pond even when the price of external irrigation water is low (Figure 5-20.) As a result,
the farmer’s consumption as well as his utility becomes less sensitive to the increasing number
of participating farms. Once the farmer builds a 10% pond, the pond supplies all his irrigation
needs. Then the number of farms no longer has any eﬀect on the water purchased or the
farmer’s utility.
The certainty equivalence approximation predicts higher supplemental water from the reser-
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Figure 5-18: Sensitivity analysis of fraction of time worked oﬀ-farm employment to labor wage
rate and reservoir’s water price.
107
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1950
2000
2050
2100
Perfect Information
price
ut
ili
ty
30 farms
45 farms
60 farms
75 farms
90 farms
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1950
2000
2050
2100
Certainty Equivalence
price
ut
ili
ty
30 farms
45 farms
60 farms
75 farms
90 farms
Figure 5-19: Sensitivity analysis of individual utility of consumption to the number of farms
and water price. The base case is when the communal reservoir serves 30 identical farms.
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Figure 5-20: Sensitivity analysis of pond size to the number of farms participating and the
reservoir’s water price.
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Figure 5-21: Sensitivity analysis of water purchased from the reservoir to the number of farms
and water price.
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voir than the perfect information approximation. Yet, the plots in Figure 5-21 show similar
impact of farm participation.
5.3 Findings
5.3.1 Model Validation
The model’s results show that there are only minor diﬀerences between the simulation results
of the two assumptions. While the perfect information approximation method enables us
to estimate the value of meteorological information, the certainty equivalence approximation
makes a more conservative assumption on the farmer’s knowledge of future hydrology. Hence
its predictions of the farmer’s behaviors do not overestimate the benefits of the associated policy
implementation.
The actual farmer’s behaviors are consistent with the certainty equivalent results from our
model in response to the nominal policy with zero water price. The 22 of the 34 farms in
the Wat Mongkol Chaipattana Royal Development Study Center receive free reservoir water
and choose not to build an on-farm pond.1 These farms cultivate dry-season crops. We
have a 14-month (June 1996-May 1997) monthly record of amount of water diverted from the
Huai Hin Khao reservoir to three of the 22 farms. The average diverted water to each farm is
7,641.0 cubic meters of reservoir water during December-March and 9,430.2 cubic meters during
April-July. These amounts exhibit 11.5 % and 5.8% below the certainty equivalence estimates
derived from the same periods, respectively.
Furthermore, one farm outside the royal study center which belongs to Mr. Tongsuk Pimsan
is not directly connected to the reservoir supply system. The Pimsan farm, however, received
a full funding from a donor for construction of the on-farm pond. The owner chose to install
a pond that takes up 8.6% of his total land-holding area. Our hydrologic-economic model
predicts that the farmer picks a 10% pond given the scenario wherein the pond is fully paid for
regardless of size and water from the external storage facilities is unavailable.
Although the size of our sample is too limited to make meaningful quantitative inferences,
1Our interview with local oﬃcials and farmers was conducted during March-June, 1999. In 1997, there
were 34 farms within the Wat Mongkol Chaipattana Royal Development Study Center that receive supplemental
irrigation from Huai Hin Khao reservoir.
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the model’s output yields an acceptably accurate picture of how a generic farmer makes decisions
about pond construction, income improvement, crop selection, and irrigation strategies. We are
confident that our analysis of policy choice under certainty equivalence approximation produces
reasonable results. Therefore, further analysis on alternative policies will use the model’s
outputs from the certainty equivalence approximation.
5.3.2 Ineﬃciency Concerning the Nominal Policy
When the government fully pays for an on-farm pond regardless of size as in the nominal policy,
the farmer tends to choose an ineﬃciently large pond. Despite the fact that he has to sacrifice
more cultivation area and pay higher pond maintenance costs, the farmer still installs too big
a pond because he does not bear its construction cost.
The government should search for alternatives to the nominal policy which make more
eﬃcient use of land and the government subsidy. Such policy options include (1) charging
for water from the communal reservoir and the enhanced in-stream storage; (2) subsidy of
ponds of a specified size; (3) combining the external storage facilities which provide water at a
specified price with construction of ponds of a specified size. We can use the farm-level model
to investigate the farmer’s response to these policy options.
In addition to infrastructure investment, a one-time cash subsidy program is a reasonable
policy option. All of these government programs are discussed in more detail in Chapters 6
and 7.
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Chapter 6
The Government’s Policy
Optimization Model
This Chapter considers alternative government policies from the perspective of a social planner.
Government policies are constructed by combining four possible programs: (1) on-farm ponds
paid for by the government, (2) a publicly financed and operated communal reservoir, (3) a
publicly financed and operated in-stream storage, and (4) a direct cash subsidy to all farmers in
the region. Water from the public storage facilities is sold at a price selected by the government.
The mix of pond, reservoir water, in-stream storage water, and cash subsidy oﬀered may vary
from farm to farm. All farms are assumed to be identical (same size, productivity, etc.)
We use the farm-level model described in Chapters 4 and 5 to simulate the farmer’s response
to five decision variables which collectively define the mix of government programs applied to
each farm. The simulation results provide the basis for formulating a comprehensive policy that
maximizes aggregate utility over all farms in the region subject to various policy constraints.
We formulate the policy optimization procedure as a mixed-integer non-linear programming
problem. Our approach provides a way to make policy decisions which consider important
issues such as equity, migration, and environmental quality.
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6.1 Scope
6.1.1 Decision Variables
The policy option provided to each farm is defined by a set of five decision variables : (1) the
size of the government-subsidized pond, (2) the type of public storage facility supplying water
to the farm (communal reservoir or enhanced in-stream storage), (3) the price of water provided
from the public storage facility, (4) the number of farms sharing the public storage facility, and
(5) the amount of cash subsidy given to the farmer. Further details are described below.
Pond size
The government specifies the maximum size of a pond (0, 5, 10 or 15% of available land) and
pays for its construction. If the farmer prefers a larger pond, he must pay the additional cost
to expand the pond. As indicated in Chapter 5, farmers will accept a fully-subsidized pond if
oﬀered by the government.
Public storage facility type
For any given farm, the government has two choices on the type of public water infrastructures:
the communal reservoir or the enhanced in-stream storage. If a farm is granted access to one
public storage facility, he cannot divert water from the other public facility.
Water price from the external storage facility
When a public water facility (either a communal reservoir or enhanced in-stream storage) is
constructed, the government charges the beneficiary farmers a fixed price for water supplied
from the facility. This price can also be zero as in case of free water.
Number of farms sharing the external storage facility
In addition to price, the government needs to limit the number of beneficiary farms sharing the
external storage facility. The water available to each beneficiary is the total yield from the
external storage facility divided by the number of participating farms.
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Cash subsidy
The government may choose to give a one-time cash subsidy to farmers in addition to providing
on-farm ponds and/or public storage facilities. The cash subsidy is given to an individual farm
at the beginning of the first period. We require that the cash subsidy amount is distributed
evenly among all farms in the region.
Our study focuses only on irrigation investment and direct cash transfer. Nevertheless,
other agricultural development options excluded from the analysis are also worth mentioning.
Programs such as free fertilizer, machinery rental, crop price control, grain storage, and low
or no interest loans have been introduced and implemented in several countries to improve
small-scale agriculture. If desired, these policies could be conveniently integrated into our
model framework through modification of cost parameters and the crop simulation submodel
(CROP). Future research should consider these aid programs in a larger context that includes
macroeconomic and political factors.
6.1.2 Inputs Obtained from the Farm-level Model
This section discusses the response of the farm-level model to the various decision variables
identified above. In each case, the three farm-level outputs required by the government-level
model are the farmer’s utility, the amount of water purchased, and the days of the oﬀ-farm
employment.
Utility
The objective of the government-level model is to maximize the aggregate utility over all farmers
in the study region. Therefore, the utility of consumption derived from the farm-level model
is the most important input. The farmer’s individual utility depends on all of the five decision
variable listed above.
Farmer’s utility from the pond installation program increases with pond size and starts to
decline when the size is equal to 10% of the land-holding area. The farmer does not need
a pond bigger than 10% because the marginal production loss from sacrificing land for pond
construction is larger than the marginal benefit gained from having additional water storage.
115
Increased water price and increased number of farms together decrease the individual
farmer’s utility. The farmer’s utility level depends more strongly on price and number of
farms when the external storage facility is the communal reservoir because the reservoir can
supply a much larger portion of the farmer’s water requirements.
Naturally, the farmer’s utility increases with the amount of cash subsidy. Although the
farmer’s wealth does not contribute directly to his utility level, the increase in wealth, provided
by a one-time cash subsidy, allows the farmer to raise his overall consumption or to smooth it
out during times of financial distress. Since the farmer is risk-averse, the cash subsidy provides
a diminishing marginal return to welfare.
Water purchased
Sale of water from public storage facilities determines the amount of money generated from the
government’s investment in public infrastructure. If the water price is adequately high but
below the farmer’s demand, the external storage project can generate profit to cross-subsidize
other government programs. By contrast, the pond program does not generate revenue since
the pond water is harvested within the farm’s boundary.
The net government subsidy required to implement a combination of programs to a specific
farm is therefore calculated as follows:
Net Subsidy =
X
Infrastructure Costs+Cash Subsidy−Revenue from Water Purchases.
The infrastructure costs include the construction of both public storage facilities and on-farm
ponds.1 The revenue from water purchases is the total present value of revenue from water
sales over the time horizon of each public storage facility. The net government subsidy over all
farms is constrained by the available funds for government investment in the region. We call
this limitation the “budget constraint”.
1The estimates of water infrastructure’s costs can be found in Appendix C.
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Oﬀ-farm employment
In addition to the farmer’s utility level and water purchases, the government is also concerned
with the problem of urban migration. This problem is most severe during droughts when
farmers seek short-term jobs in town. The results from our sensitivity analysis indicate that
a higher water price and a larger number of participating farms lead to more urban migration,
as measured by the number of days worked oﬀ-farm.
Farmers rarely work oﬀ-farm if they have an on-farm pond. A pond of size 10% or larger
is able to harvest adequate irrigation water during the dry season to enable the farmer to work
exclusively on-farm. However, if the budget available for government investment is too small,
it is not possible to construct 10% ponds on all farms.
The cash subsidy does not aﬀect the marginal returns from on-farm agriculture versus oﬀ-
farm employment. Therefore, the farmer’s management and employment choices do not depend
on the amount of cash subsidy provided.
6.1.3 Political Criteria
When selecting an agricultural development policy, the government must consider not only
budgetary factors but also the requirement to fulfill other political objectives. This section
discuses four criteria which the government may consider when allocating its resources: (1)
social optimum, (2) equal distribution, (3) preservation of an agrarian society, and (4) restriction
on reservoir sites.
Social Optimum
The social optimum is defined as the solution in which the total utility for all farmers in
maximized. This criterion yields the highest economic eﬃciency. The sole constraint imposed
under the social optimum criterion is the amount designated for the net government subsidy
defined earlier. Since equity is not required, some farmers may receive greater benefits than
others. Therefore, the social optimum solution may be very inequitable.
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Equal Distribution
It is possible to insure equal distribution of the government subsidy if the five decision variables
are required to be the same for every farm. That is, every farm receives the same treatment.
The policy adopted in the equal distribution criterion may include more than one program
depending on available funds.
Preservation of an Agrarian Society
The objective of many agricultural development schemes is not only to improve the well-being
of agricultural households but also to strengthen local social unity as stated in the Jeﬀersonian
ideal of an agrarian society. If farmers move to the urban areas for significant portions of
the year, the result can be an increase in social problems, weakening of community strength,
and generation of additional government expenditures associated with urban migration. The
government consequently would like to minimize oﬀ-farm employment as well as to maximize
the farmers’ aggregate utility.
Our study examines the scenario in which the government wants to maintain an agrarian
society and deter any oﬀ-farm employment. Instead of restraining the farmers from seeking oﬀ-
farm employment, the government must give enough incentive to all farmers to stay exclusively
on-farm by securing suﬃcient and cheap irrigation water for all farms in the region.
Reservoir Restriction
Constructing a reservoir requires a geologically suitable location, a feasible plan to relocate
local residents, and measures to deal with associated environmental problems. In many cases,
a reservoir project may be too politically controversial to be feasible. The reservoir restriction
scenario provides the government with only three program elements: the pond installation,
in-stream storage, and cash subsidy.
6.2 Structure
The government-level policy optimization model is structured as a mixed-integer non-linear
programming problem and executed in GAMS. The discretization and decision variables in
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this non-linear programming problem are compatible with those used in the farm-level model.
The policy model is run repeatedly for diﬀerent amounts of total government budget ranging
from 5 to 30 million baht and for each of the four political criteria. We outline the key inputs
and decision variables of the policy optimization model as follows:
Array Indices Definition
i pond size {0, 5%, 10%, 15%}
j public storage facility type {0=none, 1=reservoir, 2=in-stream storage}
p price of water from the public storage facility {0, 0.5, 1.0, ... ,10.0}
n number of farms sharing the public storage facility {30, 35, ... , 100}
Inputs Definition Units
utilityijpn utility of an individual farm with a subsidized pond of size i
using public storage facility j at water price p, sharing with
n− 1 other farms
util
costijpn total budget required for implementation of the policy that sub-
sidizes ponds of size i with public storage facility j charging
water price p to n farms
baht
employijpn percentage of time spent on oﬀ-farm employment of an individ-
ual farmer with a subsidized pond of size i using public storage
facility j at water price p sharing with n− 1 other farms
%
nfarmn GAMS variable corresponding to the index n (nfarmn = n)
totalfarm the total number of farms in the study region
totalwork the maximum percentage of oﬀ-farm employment allowed %
totalsub the total government budget allocated for the study region baht
Decision Vairables Definition Units
TOTALUTIL the farmers’ aggregate utility util
NUMijpn the number of farms with a subsidized pond of size i
using public storage facility j at water price p sharing
with n− 1 other farms
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NUMijpn = nfarmn if i, j, p, n adopted, and =0 oth-
erwise
CASH amount of cash subsidy given to an individual farm baht
UTILCASH increased individual utility as a result of cash subsidy util
The first three inputs—utilityijpn, costijpn, employijpn—are obtained from the farm-level model.
Particular policy options are defined by indices i, j, p, and n and the decision variable CASH.
These options are implemented by switching NUMijpn from 0 to a positive number which
specifies the number of farms with a particular i, j, p, n combination.
Objective Function
TOTALUTIL =
X
i
X
j
X
p
X
n
utilityijpnNUMijpn + totalfarmUTILCASH (6.1)
The objective function is to maximize the total utility of all 100 farmers. The right-hand
side of Equation 6.1 multiplies individual utility for each i, j, p, n combination by the number of
farms with that combination. All farms share the cash subsidy equally, with each farm gaining
a utility of UTILCASH.
Constraints
Total number of farms : Equation 6.2 limits the number of farms summed over all i, j, p, n
combinations to the total number of farms in the region. This policy analysis considers 100
identical farming households (totalfarm = 100).
X
i
X
j
X
p
X
n
NUMijpn ≤ totalfarm (6.2)
Total government budget : Equation 6.3 serves as a budget constraint. In Chapter 7
we vary the amount of available budget (totalsub) over the range of 5-30 million baht.
X
i
X
j
X
p
X
n
costijpn
NUMijpn
nfarmn
+ totalfarmCASH ≤ totalsub (6.3)
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Utility from cash subsidy : The amount of cash subsidy (CASH) is a continuous
decision variable. The curve of UTILCASH takes a concave paraboloidal form as a result of
diminishing marginal utility of income. The coeﬃcients of this curve are specific to our case
study.
UTILCASH = 0.000236 CASH2 + 0.743 CASH (6.4)
Uniqueness : Equation 6.5 constrains the decision variables to insure that only one water
price and one number of participating farms are selected for each combination of the pond size
i and the public storage facility j.
X
p
X
n
NUMijpn
nfarmn
≤ 1 ∀i, j (6.5)
all other variables ≥ 0
Agrarian Society Constraint (use only when the agrarian society criterion is imposed.)
Equation 6.6 constrains oﬀ-farm employment. In the social optimum criterion, the percent-
age of oﬀ-farm employment (totalwork) is currently set at 100% to allow maximum flexibility
for oﬀ-farm migration. This agrarian society criterion sets totalwork to zero since it requires
that all farmers work exclusively on-farm. It is important to note that the farmers still have
the option to work oﬀ-farm. Instead, the government is obliged to give suﬃcient incentive to
the farmers such that they always prefer staying on-farm.
1
totalfarm
X
i
X
j
X
p
X
n
employijpnNUMijpn ≤
totalwork
100
(6.6)
Equal Distribution (use only when the equal distribution criterion is imposed.)
Under the equal distribution criterion, we introduce a restriction to ensure that all 100 farms
benefit from the same policy combination. Equation 6.7 rules out the policy options which
provide uneven treatment to all of the considered farms.
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NUMijpn = totalfarm for n = totalfarm (6.7)
= 0 otherwise
Reservoir Restriction (use only when the reservoir restriction is imposed.)
When this restriction is imposed, the government cannot construct the communal reservoir.
Equation 6.8 only allows j index to take on values j = 0 (no public storage facility) and j = 2
(the enhanced in-stream storage.)
j ∈ {0, 2} (6.8)
6.3 Assumptions
The policy optimization model considers 100 identical farms. Each of the 100 farmers may not
necessarily receive the same government subsidized program unless the equal distribution crite-
rion is enforced. The maximum number of beneficiary farms is limited by the physical location
and capacity of the external storage facilities. In addition, we require that at least 30 farms
be served by a public storage facility in order to account for economy of scale considerations.
The policy optimization model assumes eﬀective implementation in terms of monitoring and
physical systems. For example, there is no necessary water leakage in the reservoir, the in-
stream storage, or the distribution network. The government can fully and accurately collect
the revenue from water sales from all beneficiary farmers. There are no transaction costs.
Minimal regulation is imposed on the farmers. Our analysis is based on the scenario in
which the government lets the farmers decide on what is best for them. The government gives
incentives rather than regulates the farmers’ actions.
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Chapter 7
Policy Discussions
This Chapter discusses the results from the government-level model outlined in Chapter 6.
These results show the optimal subsidy allocations with respect to each of the four political
criteria and for diﬀerent levels of total available subsidy, ranging from 5 to 30 million baht.
Then we highlight findings and address the institutional issues influencing our results.
Our policy analysis is based on farm-level results derived with the certainty equivalence
approximation because this approximation represents a conservative description of the farmer’s
knowledge. Hence its predictions of the farmer’s behavior do not overestimate benefits.
Note that the optimal policies identified in this chapter are specific to the Huai Hin Khao
study area. The physical and economic characteristics of the site limit flexibility with respect
to capacity, performance and cost of public storage facilities. Analyses using inputs appropriate
for other areas may give qualitatively diﬀerent policy recommendations.
7.1 Optimal Combination of Policy Options
In this section we review the government strategies that maximize aggregate utility subject to
the four policy criteria identified in Section 6.1. Each strategy is defined in terms of the utility
deficit from the best-case scenario, which establishes the upper bound for the utility level.
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7.1.1 Best-case & Worst-case Scenarios
Our best-case assumes that free water is provided to all farms as if an infinite amount of
water is available at all times. The farmers consequently earn maximum possible income from
water-abundant agriculture. The resulting best-case utility is equal to 2,106.21 utils per farm.
On the other hand, the no-subsidy case serves as the worst-case scenario. The farmer is
able to choose his crops, work oﬀ-farm, construct a pond, and borrow money at market rates.
However, he receives no subsidy from the government and no external supplemental irrigation
is available. This worst-case utility is equal to 1,795.92 utils per farm.
The results presented in the following sections fall between these best- and worst-case sce-
narios. They reflect the eﬀects of a limited government subsidy, constrained by various political
criteria.
7.1.2 The Social Optimum Criterion
Figure 7-1 shows the allocation of the government’s subsidy to diﬀerent programs for diﬀerent
total subsidy levels. Our study assumes a total of 100 farms that may receive diﬀerent treat-
ment from the government. The most drastic example of inequitable distribution is when the
government generates profit from one group of farmers which is used to subsidize another. In
the case of a 5-million-baht total subsidy, 80 farms purchase irrigation water from the reservoir
at the price of 2.50 baht/cu.m. Revenues from these water purchase subsidize pond construc-
tion for the other 20 farms. The cash subsidy is divided evenly among all 100 farms.
When the government raises the total subsidy to 10 million baht, 85 farms buy water at a
lower price of 2.00 baht/cu.m. while the other 15 farms receive the remaining subsidy for a 10%
pond. When the total subsidy rises to 15 million baht, the government also invests in enhanced
in-stream storage. We limit the minimum number farms sharing the in-stream storage to 30.
The resulting policy provides 30 farms with in-stream storage water and the other 70 farms
with reservoir water, both at 1.00 baht/cu.m. Further increases to 20 and 25 million baht
enable water price to be reduced with a resulting improvement on aggregate utility.
The subsidy level of 30 million baht is adequate to provide free reservoir water to all of the
100 farms. However, the utility achieved by sharing free reservoir water among 70 farms is
2056.85 utils, substantially higher than the 2002.01 utils obtained when this water is shared
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among 100 farms. In this case, 70 farms share water from the reservoir. This approach
maximizes average utility for the region, each receiving more water than would be possible if
100 farms shared the reservoir. The other 30 farms purchase water from in-stream storage at
a price of 1.00 baht/cu.m.
Recall that external price, number of participating farms, and pond size are all discrete.
This discretization causes the subsidy allocations shown in Figure 7-1 to change abruptly be-
tween diﬀerent subsidy levels. Nevertheless, the general trend toward increased reliance on the
reservoir is apparent from the figure.
Figure 7-1: Optimal subsidy allocation to each policy under social optimum criterion. Table
7.3a provides results. The negative values represent revenue (i.e., negative subsidy).
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Table 7.3a : Optimal subsidy allocation under social optimum criterion.
The social optimum criterion yields the highest average utility, illustrated as the frontier
for maximum utility deficit in Figure 7-5. Yet it raises a serious political problem of social
inequity. The arbitrary process in which an individual farm is assigned benefits aggravates
this problem. Inequality is not the only adverse outcome associated with the social optimum
criterion. Under the social optimum, a large percentage of farmers still work oﬀ-farm during
droughts. They either use irrigation support only from the in-stream storage or pay a high
price for reservoir water (above 1.0 baht/cu.m.) This allocation aggravates the problem of
urban migration in dry seasons. For these reasons it is useful to consider other policy criteria
which give lower aggregate utility but account for equity and/or migration.
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7.1.3 The Equal Distribution Criterion
Under the equal distribution criterion, the government allocates aid money to only two pro-
grams: the communal reservoir and the direct cash subsidy. The results shown in Figure 7-2
(Table 7.3b) indicates that the money allocated to the reservoir program increases in steps as
the total subsidy increased. This reflects a gradual decrease in the price charged for reservoir
water. As before, the cash subsidy is divided evenly to all 100 farms. The social gain obtained
by imposing the equality constraint comes at an economic cost: the equal distribution criterion
performs worse than the social optimum criterion (Figure 7-5) in that the average utility falls.
Figure 7-2: Optimal subsidy allocation to each policy under equal distribution criterion. Table
7.3b provides results.
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Table 7.3b : Optimal subsidy allocation under equal distribution criterion.
The equal distribution optimum still does not deal with the urban migration problem. All
of the 100 farms rely exclusively on irrigation from the reservoir. The farmers do not have
suﬃcient funds to self-invest in an on-farm pond. When the water price is above 1.0 baht/cu.m.,
they seek employment in town roughly 33% of the time, mainly during the dry season.
7.1.4 The Agrarian Society Criterion
Figure 7-3 (with details in Table 7.3c) illustrates the subsidy allocation which insures that all
of the 100 farms have enough irrigation water to earn net agricultural incomes higher than oﬀ-
farm wages. The government needs to provide a subsidy of at least 15 million baht to achieve
this goal. With a larger subsidy, the government allocates funding primarily to the reservoir
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and the pond installation program. A tiny percentage goes into the cash subsidy program.
Figure 7-3: Optimal subsidy allocation to each policy under agrarian society criterion. The
pond subsidy goes to construction of a 5% pond for each farm. Table 7.3c provides detailed
results.
The agrarian society criterion performs worse than the social optimum criterion. Yet its
average utility deficit is comparable to that under the equal distribution criterion even though
the combination of policy allocations is substantially diﬀerent (Tables 7.3b and 7.3c). This is
also illustrated in Figure 7-5.
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Table 7.3c : Optimal subsidy allocation under agrarian society criterion. N/A means the
available subsidy cannot fulfill the no-migration requirement.
Although the agrarian society criterion prevents the problem of urban migration, the amount
of subsidy is not evenly distributed if the total subsidy is below 30 million baht. When the
total subsidy is at 30 million baht, the government can meet both the equal distribution and
the agrarian society criteria since all of the 100 farms receive free water from the reservoir.
7.1.5 The Reservoir Restriction Criterion
Under this criterion, the reservoir is not constructed and the government is left with only
the pond installation, in-stream storage, and cash subsidy programs. The in-stream storage,
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supporting all of the 100 farms free of charge, requires only 2.5 million baht of subsidy. Nev-
ertheless, the individual utility level under the in-stream storage scheme is small in comparison
to that from the on-farm pond scheme. Only when the in-stream storage is shared by 30 or
fewer farms and provides free water does an individual farm’s utility level exceed the utility
from a 5% pond. Consequently the best strategy is to maximize the number of ponds installed
while allowing non-ponded farms to divert water from in-stream storage.
Figure 7-4 depicts the trend of the optimization results. As the total subsidy increases,
a larger share is allocated to pond installation and in-stream storage provides free water to a
smaller number of farms. The subsidy allocated to ponds is distributed among 5% and 10%
ponds; a 5% pond gives lower utility yet entails substantially lower construction cost. At low
subsidy levels (5 and 10 million baht), the government charges 1.0 baht per cu.m. for in-stream
storage water even though it can provide this water for free. This is because the aggregate
utility gained from more ponds being built is greater than the utility lost due to water charges.
The farmers who divert free water from in-stream storage will work oﬀ-farm at least 5% of
the years in the study period. This number increases up to 33.3% with a higher water price
and with more farms sharing the storage supply. Furthermore, farmers who install a 5% pond
also work oﬀ-farm approximately 2.7% of the time. Only those with a 10% pond do not seek
oﬀ-farm jobs.
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Table 7.3d : Optimal subsidy allocation when the reservoir scheme is not allowed.
Figure 7-5 shows that the reservoir restriction criterion yields the worst performance among
the four alternatives considered. These results indicate that the reservoir can significantly
contribute to the aggregate utility of farmers. If we impose both the agrarian society and the
reservoir restrictions on the policy optimization, installing a pond larger than 10% is the only
scheme that satisfies both criteria. The government can do nothing but simply maximize the
number of 10% ponds being built; not all of the 100 farms will have a pond. A subsidy of 30
million baht can construct up to only 65 ponds.
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Figure 7-4: Optimal subsidy allocation to each policy when the reservoir scheme is not allowed.
Table 7.3d provides detailed results.
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If we replace the agrarian society criterion with the equal distribution criterion, the reservoir
restriction will adopt only in-stream storage and the cash subsidy. To construct a pond of any
size for all 100 farms is too expensive. Therefore, every farm will receive free irrigation water
from the in-stream storage and share the rest of the subsidy in cash.
7.2 Summary of Findings
Figure 7-5 compares results from the four alternative political criteria. The x-axis represents
the total budget available to the government and the y-axis represents the average utility deficit
over all 100 farms. The utility deficit is defined as a deviation of each criterion’s average utility
from the ideal case scenario in which all farmers receive unlimited free irrigation water.
We highlight the findings from our policy analysis as follows:
• As expected, the social optimum criterion yields the highest average utility because it
only has a total budget constraint, as compared to the three other political criteria which
are more constrained.
• The social optimum solution is both inequitable and unable to prevent the problem of
urban migration across all levels of available subsidy.
• The reservoir restriction performs worst among all four criteria. All other solutions rely
on the reservoir as an important part of the government policy.
• Public (reservoir and in-stream storage) and private (pond) water services are never pro-
vided to the same farm due to the large subsidy requirement. The government’s subsidy
is better used by providing either water from public storage or water from an on-farm
pond, but not both, to any given farm.
• Funding may be insuﬃcient to achieve a certain goal. One example in our analysis is
that the agrarian society requires a subsidy of at least 15 million baht.
• Value judgments are required in order to decide on a specific policy. The government
needs to trade-oﬀ the goals of economic eﬃciency, social equity, preservation of an agrarian
society, and the desire to avoid reservoir construction.
134
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Total Subsidy [million baht]
U
til
ity
 D
ef
ic
it
Social Optimum    
Equal Distribution    
Agrarian Society       
No Reservoir             
Figure 7-5: Average utility deficit for 100 farming households with respect to diﬀerent amount
of subsidy under each of the four political criteria (even if each farm receives uneven share of
the subsidy.) The utility deficit is defined as the deviation of the criterion’s average utility
from the ideal case scenario in which irrigation water is free and unlimited. The utility deficit
level without any subsidy is 310.29 utils per farm.
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• The results and conclusions of our analysis are based on a particular site only. We also
assume that implementation is eﬀective and that transaction costs are negligible. For
these reasons, some caution must be used in recommending the policies considered here.
7.3 Institutional Issues
There are some important institutional problems surrounding implementation of irrigation
schemes in Thailand. Here we do not recommend solutions to these problems, but only point
out how they influence the eﬀectiveness of the policies suggested in our analysis.
7.3.1 Overlapping Authorities
The government agencies responsible for water resources management in Thailand include 31
oﬃces in 8 ministries. The agencies concerned with irrigation facilities include 17 oﬃces in 7
ministries. The agencies involved in pond construction alone include 12 oﬃces in 3 ministries.
The major players are the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of the
Interior. On top of this structure is the Oﬃce of the National Water Resources Committee
which is presided over by the Prime Minister. [44] This complicated structure results in a lack
of unity and ineﬃciency in policy implementation.
7.3.2 Ineﬀective Monitoring
Ineﬀective monitoring brings about a “common-pool property” problem that aﬄicts public
water infrastructure’s resource. Improvement can be made through capital and labor invest-
ments. Examples of capital investment are the installation of more monitoring equipment and
improvements in the accuracy of existing equipment. Labor investment includes training gov-
ernment oﬃcials as well as local farmers on monitoring of water usage. Community-monitoring
programs have proven to be successful in many areas of the region.
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7.3.3 Economic Ineﬃciency
Command and control
The current command-and-control approach to irrigation programs does not account for the
individual farmer’s preference. As a result, farmer mays respond diﬀerently than intended.
For instance, a program of free 5% ponds may not supply adequate water to sustain all farms
during the dry season. Instead, the farmers move to town and the land is left fallow. As
another example, if the government could require that the farmers must stay on-farm, economic
benefits would decrease since the farmers must forgo an oﬀ-farm employment alternative that
yields higher income.
Cross-sectoral subsidy
The funds needed to finance agricultural development schemes such as those discussed here
come from the national government budget. The government should consider the importance
of improvements in the agricultural sector as compared to other social and economic needs such
as investments in education or industrial development. Cross-sectoral subsidies tend to distort
incentives in the economy at large.
Cross-sectoral subsidies can also be subtle or indirect. For example, if farmers do not move
into urban areas as a result of agricultural subsidy ultimately derived from the urban industrial
sector, then the urban areas benefit from a reduction in some of the costs incurred by migration
to the cities.
Government intervention
Failure in credit markets causes the government to step in to help finance the water infrastruc-
ture. Instead of intervention, the government should develop market institutions to enable
individual farmers to borrow money without collateral for a profitable but non-divisible invest-
ment (e.g., the communal reservoir and the in-stream storage).
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7.3.4 Poor Information
Meteorological and hydrological information
Better information on meteorology and hydrology should be provided to social planners and to
the farmers alike. Many uncertainties and data limitations could be resolved with a focused
field and laboratory data collecting program. The cost of this data collection program should
be evaluated in light of the benefits that could be gained from better information on weather
and likely crop yields.
Agricultural techniques
Better knowledge on agricultural techniques should be provided to all local farmers. Examples
of techniques that improve eﬃciency are leakage prevention and water-harvesting. These
techniques must be adjusted to suit the needs and problems of each particular location.
7.3.5 Value Judgments
Decisions on the trade-oﬀs between economic eﬃciency and other sociopolitical goals should
come from the elected local administration, rather than the centralized government, for more
public participation.
7.3.6 Globalized Agricultural Markets
The prices of agricultural products have plummeted in real terms in the second half of the
twentieth century. [31] This constant drop is due in part to the more globalized markets.
The problem is also aggravated by the fact that the developed countries such as the United
States or the European Union highly subsidize their agricultural products under protectionistic
policies. This trend aﬀects the potential impact of government-funded agricultural development
programs in countries such as Thailand.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
This final Chapter summarizes contributions of this research and suggests directions for future
research.
8.1 Summary of Original Contributions
This thesis makes three key contributions: (1) we establish a direct link between hydrology,
agronomy, and economics by developing a farm-level that accounts for meteorological uncer-
tainty, crop water requirement, and farmer’s wealth; (2) we develop a model that identifies
the optimum government policy fro subsidizing irrigated agriculture while accounting for the
preferences of individual farmers; and (3) we analyze government policy options for managing
a farming region given diﬀerent political objectives: social optimum, equitable distribution,
preservation of an agrarian society, and reservoir restriction in a case study based on a region
in Saraburi Province, Thailand.
8.1.1 Farm-level Model
In this model, we establish a direct link between hydrology, agronomy, and microeconomics.
By integrating these three factors, we conduct a full-scale investigation of a small-scale farmer’s
welfare-maximizing process which accounts for meteorological uncertainty, water stress, and
economic constraints.
Our hydrologic-economic model adheres closely to the decision-making process of the small-
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scale farmer. The farmer’s decision choices include pond construction, consumption behavior,
time spent on agricultural activities, crop and irrigation patterns, and amount of water pur-
chased from public storage facilities. This model can be employed to investigate an individual
farmer’s management decisions in response to diﬀerent policy scenarios.
The farm-level model assumes that the farmer behaves rationally in making decisions under
uncertainty. To do so, we develop a computationally feasible representation of a small-scale
farmer’s welfare-maximizing process under uncertainty by applying a discrete-time suboptimal
control technique. A comparison of the perfect information and the certainty equivalence
approximations enables us to estimate the value of meteorological information.
The actual farmer’s behavior is not too far removed from the outputs of our model. Al-
though the size of our sample is too limited to make a meaningful quantitative inferences, the
model’s output appears to provide an accurate picture of how a generic farmer makes decisions
about pond construction, income improvement, crop selection, and irrigation strategies.
8.1.2 Government-level Model
The government-level optimization model identifies a comprehensive policy that maximizes a
stated measure of aggregate social welfare subject to various political requirements. It provides
a way to make policy decisions which consider important issues such as equity, migration, and
environmental quality. This government-level model uses the farm-level model to derive the
farmer’s response to diﬀerent government policy scenarios. We formulate the policy optimiza-
tion procedure as a mixed-integer non-linear programming problem.
We oﬀer a new approach to solving the policy problem by assuming eﬀective implementation
and minimal regulation. This approach is a demand-side policy design instrument which allows
interaction between the farm-level and the government-level models. As a result, it avoids a
command-and-control approach which potentially brings about economic ineﬃciency.
8.1.3 Analysis of Irrigation Policy in the Saraburi Area
The policy recommendations that emerge from our study focus on improving the eﬀectiveness
of irrigation subsidies. A subsidized infrastructure enhances the farmers’ control over his crops.
It helps the farmers increase their ability to survive dry periods while taking advantage of wet
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periods.
• How this analysis prepares a social planner to make policy recommendations
We use the farm-level model to evaluate policy options for managing an irrigation system in
a case study of Saraburi Province, Thailand. This model allows us to investigate the impacts
of diﬀerent policy options on the individual farmer’s behavior and welfare. A social planner,
equipped with this information, can weigh the pros and cons of diﬀerent policy outcomes in
order to make an appropriate policy recommendation.
• Dominant features on which the results depend
Our analysis is heavily location-specific. We need information on the meteorology, hydrol-
ogy, agriculture, and microeconomics of the study site. However, this approach was designed
with convenient reconstruction in mind. Because data requirements are relatively limited, it
is easy to reconfigure our model system for analysis of other sites.
Our policy analysis considers the region consisting of 100 identical farms. The assumption
that all farmers are identical is acceptable due to the small size of the study region. Larger
regions may require the explicit recognition of diﬀerent farmers’ characteristics in order to
provide a more accurate description of the eﬀects of government policy.
Computational limitations played an important part in the design of our approach. They
limit the time horizon and prevent finer discretization of the state variables. They also force
us to deal with the stochastic nature of the problem in an indirect manner. Although we
are confident that our certainty equivalence assumption yields reasonable results, the ability
to implement an exact stochastic dynamic programming solution would enable us to model
farmer’s responses more accurately.
• What the approach does not tell us
The reliability of the analysis depends strongly on the quality of data used as inputs. Our
results should be interpreted with some caution as unreliable data could introduce errors. The
current data set can be improved with a focused field and laboratory data collection program.
The cost of this program should be evaluated in light of the benefits that could be gained from
a more reliable assessment of irrigation policy.
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Failure to monitor generates a “common pool property” problem that aﬄicts public water
infrastructure resources. Our approach assumes eﬀective monitoring. Improvement in this
regard can be achieved through capital investment (installing equipment) as well as labor in-
vestment (training for government oﬃcials and local farmers). The cost of such improvements
may or may not exceed the potential benefit. Self- or community-monitoring proves successful
in many agricultural areas.
The macro-economic ramifications of individual farmer’s policy choices need to be addressed
more thoroughly. Cash subsidies, in particular, can create adverse outcomes; for example, the
recipient farmers may relocate after being granted the cash transfer. The use of a cash subsidy
as a tool to keep farmers in the agricultural sector needs more analysis.
8.2 Recommendations for Future Research
There are many possible improvements that can be made in our farm and government-level
modules. We group six issues for future research into two main categories: a modelling category
and policy application category.
8.2.1 Modelling Issues
Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Advances in computer technology should make it possible to solve our farm-level model with a
stochastic dynamic programming algorithm. The results from stochastic dynamic programming
are generally superior to those obtained by assuming that farmers solve a deterministic control
problem.
The reduction of a class of stochastic optimal control problems to simpler problems may
provide an alternative method to reformulate a more computationally manageable version of our
farm-level stochastic dynamic problem. Examples are decomposition methods as introduced by
Sethi and Zhang (2001). These methods suggest how one can construct nearly optimal controls
for the given system from the optimal solutions of the simpler reduced problems. Research
in this area oﬀers the potential to deal with large dynamic stochastic hydrologic-economic
problems.
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Heterogeneity among Farmers
The homogeneity of the farmers in our model is acceptable due to our small study area. How-
ever, if this model would be employed in a larger area, heterogeneity should be considered.
Providing for heterogeneity could permit a more eﬃcient subsidy allocation based on individ-
ual needs. Furthermore, water and labor markets among farms with diverse attributes could be
introduced. When all farms are identical, the comparative advantage and scale diﬀerentiation
are absent. There is no reason to trade.
More Realistic Hydrologic Models
Improvements in the hydrologic model can be made through more hydrologically sophisticated
and computationally feasible representations of the root zone and deep percolation as well as a
spatially-distributed watershed analysis.
8.2.2 Policy Application Issues
Groundwater Potential
In addition to surface water, Thailand has sizable unconsolidated aquifers that are used for
domestic and industrial water supply and irrigation. However, the quantity of water that can
be sustainably pumped from these aquifers is not known in many cases, and pumping is not
eﬀectively regulated. Even where the pumping rate has long been recognized as unsustainable,
pumping sometimes continues uncontrolled.
Water balance analyses of Saraburi and other prospective sites for irrigation development
scheme should include quantitative studies of shallow groundwater resources. The combination
of surface water storage and shallow groundwater pumping for wider irrigation coverage should
be assessed. In theory, constructing an unlined rainwater storage structure markedly improves
groundwater recharge. Future studies should determine whether shallow aquifers in the region
of interest could supply significant amounts of irrigation water of acceptable quality and whether
conjunctive use is economically desirable.
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Other Agricultural Policies
Agricultural productivity must be improved, in order to address the food and income require-
ments of poor households, the raw material needs of the agro-processing sector, and continued
export growth. While the agricultural sector will continue to require large subsidies in the
future to fuel the growth of more productive parts of the economy, there is no question that
agriculture will remain a core element of Thailand’s rural development strategy and that the
country will retain some comparative advantage in agricultural production.
Government subsidies can be used as incentives to encourage farmers to stay in the agri-
cultural sector. There are several economic instruments to encourage farming. Examples of
the commonly practiced instruments are tax credits, cash transfers, fertilizer loans, and price
controls on agricultural production. Nevertheless, prior to implementing such policies, we need
to thoroughly investigate the adverse consequence of government intervention.
Thus far, we have only discussed the benefit-cost structure of irrigation development schemes.
We also need to consider the aggregate eﬀects of sustainable agricultural improvement. The
second phase of His Majesty’s New Theory suggests that farmers combine their eﬀorts and re-
sources in the form of a group or cooperative. Cost-sharing activities such as soil preparation,
irrigation management, and product distribution can dramatically increase the profit of each
individual farming household. The government can help farmers to coordinate a common pool
of resources by establishing cooperative groups.
Macroeconomic Issues
It is also necessary to identify under what conditions institutional credits are needed in order
for small-scale farmers to benefit from available irrigation systems. Currently both on-farm
and larger reservoir projects in Thailand are fully-funded by the government. Most areas that
reject irrigation projects do so because of the lack of well-functioning credit market. Small-
scale irrigation systems are available only to economically advantaged farmer groups and a
small number of subsidized communities. To make the system more applicable to other areas,
government-aid programs may be needed to jump start the process and encourage its use by
economically disadvantaged groups. For example, the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural
Cooperatives is considering a program of low-interest loans for supplementary communal reser-
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voirs. The approach to this issue is to compare alternative financial options for funding the
project.
The eﬀectiveness of water management, including promoting the adoption of new irrigation
infrastructure and monitoring water usage, requires a well-structured administrative body. In
Thailand, there is considerable overlap in the administrative responsibilities of the Royal Irri-
gation Department (RID), the Local Administration Department, and the regional water users
associations. This complicated structure results in a lack of unity and brings about ineﬃciency
in water management. Further study of the institutional impacts of the use and promotion of
on-farm reservoirs is needed.
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Appendix A
Certainty Equivalence Controller
The certainty equivalent controller (CEC or naive feed-back controller) is a suboptimal control
scheme that is motivated by linear-quadratic control theory. It applies at each stage the control
that would be optimal if all the uncertain qualities were fixed at their expected values; that is,
it acts as if a form of the certainty equivalence principle were holding. [8]
The basic problem with perfect state information has the objective function defined as
follows:
max g(xN) +
N−1X
t=0
g(xt, ut,ωt)
where t indexes discrete time
xt is the state variable
ut is the control or decision variable
ωt is a random parameter
N is the time horizon
The state variable (xt) is subject to the state equation : xt+1 = f(xt, ut,ωt). Note that the
current state xt is measured exactly (perfect state information); that is, there is no delay in
measuring once ωt is realized, and thus no need to estimate the next state xt+1. In addition,
the CEC approach explicitly assumes that the probability measures of the input disturbances
(ωt) do not depend on xt and ut. Figure A-1 illustrates the structure of the certainty equivalent
controller.
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Figure A-1: Implementation of Certainty Equivalence Approach
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Appendix B
Summary of Parameters used in
Hydrologic-Economic Model
These parameters, specific to our study site in Saraburi Province, is used as inputs for the base-
case analysis in Chapter 5. Sensitivity analysis varies the value of some key parameters: risk
aversion measure, labor wage, and the number of participating farms to illustrate the impact of
these parameters on farmers’ decisions. In Chapter 6, implementation of policy schemes entail
the diﬀerent modifications of the number of farms sharing an external storage facility, the unit
water price, and the initial wealth level.
Parameters Value Unit Source
Number of farms shar-
ing a storage facility
30
Constant relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient
0.671
Total land-holding
area
2.40 hectare Average semi-rural own farms in Saraburi
Agricultural discount
rate
8% Siamwella (1991)
Bank’s interest rate 5% Commercial bank’s rate in Thailand in
1998
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Initial wealth 14,670 baht The figure was calculated by using long-
run average and also synconized with the
actual data [68]
Labor wage for oﬀ-
farm employment
143 baht/day Minimum daily wage for Saraburi in 1998
[Oﬃce of Wage Protection Board, Min-
istry of Labor and Social Welfare]
Price of crop produc-
tion
The farm prices are for crop year
1998/1999 [61]
lowland rice 5.76 baht/kg
maize 3.69 baht/kg
soybeans 9.75 baht/kg
Seasonal cost of crop
cultivation
Interview with the local farmers and [61]
lowland rice 3,834 baht/hectare
maize 1,313 baht/hectare
soybeans 2,350 baht/hectare
Labor required per
unit water applied
0.243 hour/m3 Interview with the local farmers during
field research in March 1999.
Pumping cost 0.10 baht/m3 This cost includes electricity and average
rental rate for the pumping machine [in-
terview in 1998-99]
Pond’s construction
cost
Estimated from unit cost of digging [23]
and [79].
a 5% pond 303,600 baht
a 10% pond 457,200 baht
a 15% pond 610,800 baht
Pond’s annualized
maintenance cost
Estimated from minimum labor wage and
silt deposit rate [interview in 1998-99]
a 5% pond 5,000 baht
a 10% pond 7,000 baht
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a 15% pond 8,000 baht
Depth of an on-farm
pond
4 m Interview with the Royal Irrigation De-
partment oﬃcials during field research in
March 1999.
External storage’s irri-
gation capacity
communal reservoir 880,000 m3 Huai Hin Khao Reservoir [79]
in-stream storage 82,810 m3 Huai Hin Khao Channel Improving
Project [23].
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Appendix C
Cost of Water Infrastructures
C.1 Cost of ponds
Pond Quantity of Dug Soil Labor Costa Leveling & Pipelines Worka Total Cost
[% of land] [m3] [baht/m3] [baht] [baht]
5% 4,800 32 150,000 303,600
10% 9,600 32 150,000 457,200
15% 14,400 28 207,000 610,800
a The rates of construction labor are obtained from [23].
Pond Size Construction Cost Fixed Paymentbc Maintenance Costb
[% of total land] [thousand baht] [thousand baht] [thousand baht]
05% 303.6 15.2 5.0
10% 457.2 22.8 7.0
15% 610.8 30.5 8.0
b The fixed payment and maintenance cost are paid every 4 months.
c The fixed payment for a self-invest pond is calculated from the construction cost
amortized over 8 years at 5% interest rate.
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C.2 Cost of the external storage facilities
The construction costs of the reservoir and the in-stream storage are both obtained from the
actual costs for Huai Hin Khao Reservoir and Huai Hin Khao Channel Improvement Project,
respectively. The cost of the enhanced in-stream storage is estimated at 2,522,048 baht by
Oﬃce of Accelerated Rural Development; the cost of the communal reservoir is 29,606,120 baht
[79].
Given the quantity of water purchased by an individual farm, we can calculate the expec-
tation of total discounted revenue from sales of irrigation water. The time horizon for the
reservoir is 40 years1 while the in-stream storage is 24 years [23]. The bank’s annual interest
rate is 5%.
1Source: personal interview with Pramote Maiklud, Director-General of Royal Irrigation Department [51].
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Appendix D
Computation of DSSAT Crop
Models
The three crop models from DSSAT used in this thesis are CERES-Rice, CERES-Maize, and
CROPGRO-Soybean. Each model simulates growth and yield of the corresponding crop vari-
eties for diﬀerent management and agroclimatic scenarios. The following are the main simula-
tion processes common in these crop models as extensively discussed in Tsuji et al (1994) and
Ritchie et al (1986).
D.1 Growth and Development
D.1.1 Phasic Development
The phasic development is concerned with the duration of growth stages. The growth stages
are (1) juvenile stage, (2) floral induction, (3) end of leaf growth, (4) anthesis and flowering,
(5) grain filling, (6) physiological maturity to harvest, (7) fallow or pre-sowing, (8) sowing to
germination, and (9) germination to emergence. The active above-ground growing stages are
numbered 1 through 5. The crop model assumes that the daily developmental rates are directly
proportional to temperatures between 8◦ and 32◦C. The thermal time requirements for each
growth stage vary with variety.
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D.1.2 Biomass Production and Partitioning
The germination factor is obtained from the 90 percent germination curve proposed by Liv-
ingston and Haasis (1933). Seed germination requires 45 degree-days for a base temperature
of 8◦C
The total leaf area of a crop population is closely related to grain production because
physiologically active leaves contribute to the photosynthesis of the plant. The photosynthetic
rate is expressed as a function of the photosynthetically active radiation (PAR). The percentage
of incoming PAR intercepted by the canopy then becomes an exponential function of the leaf
area index (LAI). The value of PAR above is assumed to be equal to 50 percent of the incoming
solar radiation. The actual rate of dry matter production is usually less than the potential
rate due to the environmental eﬀects of non-optimal temperature, water stress, or nitrogen
deficiency.
D.1.3 Root System Dynamics
Biomass is partitioned into shoots and roots. The proportion partitioned to the roots aﬀects
root density and consequently the ability of the root system to supply water and nutrients to
the shoot. The fraction of assimilates partitioned to the roots depends primarily on the growth
stage of the crop which declines as the plant matures. However, at all growth stages except
Stage 5, the fraction partitioned to the roots increases with water deficits and/or nitrogen
deficiency.
The total root growth in a day is determined by the amount of biomass partitioned to the
roots. To determine the distribution of roots in the soil, a rooting preferences factor that
decreases with depth is input for each soil layer. The preference factor of a layer is reduced
when the soil water content is below a threshold value. Thus, when a particular soil layer
becomes quite dry, root growth in that layer decreases while compensatory root growth occurs
elsewhere in the profile where the water status is favorable.
The potential rate of downward root growth is assumed to be proportional to the rate of
plant development which is influenced by temperature. The water content of each depth is used
to determine the distribution of root growth in the profile. The mass of assimilate partitioned
to the roots is converted to a root length, assuming a constant proportionality between root
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mass and length, to provide estimates of root length density. There is a small reduction in
root length in each depth to account for root sloughing.
D.2 Grain Yield
Individual grain weights very to some extent by the mean value is constant. In the DSSAT
crop models, grain weight is the product of the grain growth rate times the duration of filling .
A genetic coeﬃcient (G2) determines the grain growth rate optimum conditions. Grain growth
rate varies among varieties according to three main grain size classifications: long, medium,
and short.
Grain yield is directly proportional to the panicle wight. The model does not set any max-
imum yield potential. Rate and duration of panicle growth, as influenced by the environment
and plant size, control yield.
D.3 Soil Water Balance
The soil water balance is calculated to evaluate the possible yield reduction caused by soil and
plant water deficits. However, if the soil water balance is assumed nonlimiting then it can be
by-passed. This part of the model includes user-selected soil depth increments where water
balance calculations are made.
Water contents in any layer can increase due to infiltration of rain, irrigation water, or flow
from an adjacent layer. Water content can decrease due to soil evaporation, root absorption,
or flow to an adjacent layer. The limits to which water content increase or decrease are also
input for each layer as the lower limit of plant water availability, the filed-drained upper limit,
and the field-saturated water content.
Infiltration is calculated as the diﬀerence between daily precipitation and runoﬀ. Runoﬀ is
estimated using a Soil Conservation Service Curve Number technique. When irrigation inputs
are encountered in the model, the runoﬀ estimation is by-passed, thus allowing all irrigation to
infiltrate.
Drainage is calculated as a function of the water content above the drained upper limit
(DUL). Evapotranspiration (ET) is calculated using procedure developed by Ritchie (1972).
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Potential ET is calculated using an equilibrium evaporation concept as modified by Preistly
and Taylor (1972).
Root water uptake is calculated using an empirical evaluation of the maximum possible single
root water uptake rates. From the estimates of root length density and soil water, the maximum
possible uptake per unit root length in each soil layer is converted to the maximum uptake
for the entire root system. If this maximum uptake value exceeds then calculated potential
transpiration, then transpiration is assumed to occur at potential rate. If the maximum uptake
for the entire root zone is less than potential transpiration, then the actual uptake becomes
the maximum uptake, and the transpiration is reduced at that value. This reduction in
transpiration expressed as a fraction of the potential, is used to reduce photosynthesis, leaf
expansion, and assimilate partitioning in the growth subroutine.
D.4 Nitrogen Component
As with the soil water balance, the nitrogen component in the DSSAT crop models can be
by-passed when nitrogen fertilization is considered nonlimiting. Included in the nitrogen sub-
routine is the initialization of soil N conditions and fertilizer management, as well as the trans-
formation processes of humus, organic nitrogen, soil nitrate, and soil ammonium into N forms
usable by the plant system.
This component of the model calculates the demand for N by the crop, the supply of N
available to the crop , and the N uptake by the crop. Nitrogen stress develops when actual
nitrogen concentration of the stover (non-grain shoot) is less than the critical N requirement,
and that stress is severe when the actual concentration is equal to the minimum allowable value.
Nitrogen stress aﬀects leaf expansion, photosynthesis, and grain N concentration in the growth
subroutine.
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